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ABSTRACT 
A NOVEL E-VOTING SYSTEM WITH DIVERSE SECURITY FEATURES 
 
by 
Haijun Pan 
 
Internet-based E-voting systems can offer great benefits over traditional voting machines 
in areas, such as protecting voter and candidate privacy, providing accurate vote counting, 
preventing voter fraud, and shortening the time of vote counting. This dissertation 
introduces, establishes and improves Internet-based E-voting systems on various aspects of 
the voting procedure. In addition, our designs also enable voters to track their votes which 
is a very important element in any elections.  
Our novel Internet-based E-voting system is based on the following realistic 
assumptions: (1) The election authorities are not 100% trustworthy; (2) The E-voting 
system itself is not 100% trustworthy; (3) Every voter is not 100% trustworthy. With these 
three basic assumptions, we can form mutual restrictions on each party, and secure 
measurements of the election will not be solely determined and influenced by any one of 
them. The proposed scheme, referred to as Time-lock algorithm based E-voting system 
with Ring signature and Multi-part form (TERM), is demonstrated to achieve the goal of 
keeping votes confidential and voters anonymous, as well as reducing the risk of leaking 
the  voters’ identities during the election. In addition, TERM can prevent any possible clash 
attack, such as manipulating voting results or tampering voters’ original votes by malicious 
election authorities or hackers. The security performance analysis also shows that TERM 
provides outstanding measurements to secure the candidates’ manifest on each type of 
 
 
ballots during the whole election duration. TERM provides a roadmap for future fair 
elections via Internet. 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Objective 
Today’s society is experiencing an explosive growth in Internet-based applications and 
systems where a large number of social activities are performed online. However, most 
of the political elections in either developed or developing countries are still carried out 
using paper-based or touch screen voting systems where the voters need to cast their votes 
at a precinct. This maybe a major contributing factor in low voter turnout in elections. A 
reliable and secure Internet-based Electronic voting (E-voting) system would provide 
voters with greater convenience and more accurate vote counting process. In the 
meantime, the significant demand from launching a reliable and secure E-voting system 
has driven efforts from researchers for years. Although paper-based voting systems have 
been successfully deployed for a long time, the U.S. government has been looking into 
improving the security and accuracy of E-voting in order to avoid disputes over paper-
based voting system before/during/after an election. For instance, in Volusia County in 
Florida on election night November 2000, the main concern was with whether or how 
voters’ votes would be accurately counted in an election. There was a big dispute in 
Florida and election authorities in many counties were called to recount the votes. As we 
know, traditional voting machines with paper ballots inevitably yield a certain rate of 
misreading on the ballot. Meanwhile, using paper ballots or machine readable paper 
ballots could incur huge delay and human errors of tallying results. For example, in 
Minnesota, there was a recount and ensuing court case after Election Day because many 
miscounted ballots were discovered among the voting machines that were jammed. So 
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far, in the United States, the concept of E-voting has only been applied in some local 
governments’ electronic voting machines. Typical electronic voting procedures include 
setting up electronic voting machines and casting electronic ballots by touch screen 
devices. During recent U.S. presidential election held from the last decade, most states 
were still employing the traditional voting machines or ballot scanners with a few 
exceptions which adopted touch screen voting machines to let voters cast their ballots 
electronically. 
The objective of my research is concentrated on developments of Internet-based 
E-voting systems in the following areas: 
• Novel electronic ballot design 
• Reliable vote counting and vote tracking algorithms 
• Information security features in E-voting system 
• Cryptograph based voter privacy protection scheme 
• Clash attack prevention 
 
1.2 Challenges 
The E-voting procedure raises legitimate concerns about its reliability and trustworthiness 
when millions of voters cast their ballots over the Internet. Meanwhile, there are still 
many open issues about E-voting through the Internet. Other works have reviewed many 
concerns about the Internet E-voting, such as reliability of software, data transmission, 
database systems, confidentiality of electronic votes, detection on double voting, and vote 
buying (Wu, 2002). These concerns are aligned with the major issues of Internet attacks 
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around the globe. 
Before Internet-based E-voting systems can completely replace those traditional 
paper- based voting systems, we need to make sure that the new system will perform as 
efficiently as the traditional ones without any security and technical concerns. 
Nonetheless, here are some major challenges for researchers and authorities to deploy the 
Internet-based E-voting system:  
First, the trust from the public and the government is the cornerstone of any 
Internet-based E-voting system. It also serves as an important precondition to widely 
adopting this kind of E-voting system. During the 2000 U.S. presidential election, the 
recounting of votes and disputes in Florida demonstrated that it was time-consuming and 
could yield a certain error rate during the vote counting procedure for the machine-
readable paper ballot based voting system. Therefore, it is critical that the future 
developed E-voting system must be secure, effective and flawless. To increase public 
confidence, many states have been considering E-voting systems that provide voter-
verifiable paper audit trails.  Some efficient E-voting systems with higher vote counting 
rates have been proposed recently.  
Second, the reliability of online data transactions is worrisome to many users. 
Online data hacking and data breach incidents have been occurring at an alarming rate. 
Although the newly designed E-voting system can collect ballots quickly and count votes 
efficiently, it still relies on the Internet as the communication medium. Numerous 
concerns regarding communications among voters, authorities and E-voting systems 
through the Internet must be addressed.  The new E-voting system must be able to prevent 
hackers from conducting online cyberattacks such as unauthorized access to the system 
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and votes, maliciously jamming the data traffic resources, etc. The Internet-based E-
voting system must incorporate advanced data transmission technologies and improved 
security algorithms to detect and deter malicious online activities.  
The third critical concern is the trustworthiness of E-voting system’s designer and 
manufacturer. Although E-voting systems vendors advertise that the whole procedure of 
vote casting and ballot collecting is securely monitored and guaranteed during the 
election, but the public still lacks the confidence of these systems and they believe that 
the whole election procedure should be monitored and guarded by the public themselves. 
In this dissertation, our research works mainly focus on developing an E-voting system 
without fully relying on the trustworthiness of the election authorities and voting system. 
We have developed the measurements to place mutual restrictions among voters and 
authorities and vendors to ensure a fair election.  
Despite the challenges listed above, why shall we continue to develop and deploy 
Internet-based E-voting systems? Besides having the benefit of highly efficient vote 
counting process and saving resource, it offers the opportunity to achieve an out-standing 
performance level over traditional voting in many aspects, such as the system can allow 
voters to self-correct on their own voting mistakes which may result in an invalid vote, 
the system will prevent multiple votes from the same voter, it also shorten the time for 
counting and retrieving the voting result.  
1.3 Assumptions 
Most importantly, the political election should be conducted fairly, transparently and 
honestly under the supervision of the election authority.  But from past experiences, voters 
have concerns about whether their votes were accurately counted or have been 
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manipulated during the election (Cranor, 1997). At the same time, source codes embedded 
in the voting machines are usually proprietary, the programming and processes are always 
under a veil of secrecy.  
In this dissertation, we developed several novel E-voting models, NOTE (Name 
and vOte separaTed E-voting system), E-NOTE (Enhanced Name and vOte separaTed E-
voting system), RE-NOTE (Ring signature based Enhanced Name and vOte separated E-
voting system) , M-NOTE (Multi-part Ballot based Name and vOte separated E-voting 
system) and TERM (Timed-lock algorithm based E-voting system with the Ring 
signature certificate and Multi-part ballot form), which can better address the voting 
issues discussed above.   
Our research works make the following tenable assumptions: 
1. The election authorities are not fully trustworthy, which is a reasonable and 
practical concern from the public. 
 
2. The E-voting system itself is not fully trustworthy.   
3. The voters are not fully trustworthy.  
4. Data transmission through the Internet is reliable. Our research will only focus on 
the overall picture of designing the voting protocol and voting scheme.  
 
With these four basic assumptions, we can easily form some mutual restrictions 
among each party involved in the whole voting scheme, and the secure measurement of 
the E-voting system will not be solely determined and influenced by any of them. In 
addition, our proposed E-voting system model will allow voters to have more auditing 
capabilities in terms of vote counting and tracking during and after the election. 
We have gradually introduced, established and improved the Internet-based E-
voting system, including the solution to maintain candidates’ and voters’ confidentiality, 
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to protect voters’ privacy, and to empower voters to do vote tracking and verification, 
which are three most important elements in any political election. The corresponding E-
voting system model has well been illustrated to mitigate underlying issues discussed 
above. 
A typical voting model may endow several responsibility roles of an election such 
as registration, vote counting, and vote tally to a single entity. Since a political election is 
a complicated procedure which requires security measurements at every step of the 
process. We will introduce a voting protocol that contains several distinguished phases: 
voter registration, ballot distribution, voter casting, ballot collecting, vote counting, vote 
tally publishing, and vote auditing.  
Any voting data breach that happens in any of phases in a political election will 
lead to an invalid election result. In the past, many researchers mainly focused on the 
cryptography design or its suitability for E-voting. Our works are mainly focused on 
finding a practical solution to improve the E-voting system and prevent it from being 
hacked or manipulated by different malicious parties. Our research goal is to design an 
E-voting system model that would incorporate existing cryptographic algorithms so that 
it is secure and provisions vote audit capability instead of inventing a new mathematical 
cryptography method. We expect such a secure E-voting system model will also draw 
high participating rate from voters in the future. 
In Chapter 2, we will review the background of our research in terms of 
cryptography and protocol. We will also introduce attacks on the existing E-voting 
scheme, and we also generalize the basic requirements for setting up an E-voting system 
with fairness and transparency. 
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In Chapter 3, we introduce our previous works including NOTE, E-NOTE, RE-
NOTE, M-NOTE with paper ballot mode for readers’ better understanding. We also 
introduce useful definitions which are used in TERM for the preliminaries. 
In Chapter 4, we will give a detailed illustration of every step in TERM to achieve 
a secure and accurate voting process. Each step will illustrate a specific measurement to 
guarantee the voting operation. 
We also give details on the mathematical and security analysis of TERM and other 
proposed works in Chapter 5 and 6 to provide a full detailed description of the proposed 
E-voting system. In Chapter 7, we will conclude our works and discuss the different 
aspects of E-voting system that need to be considered for elections in the future. 
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CHAPTER 2  
LITERATUR REVIEW 
2.1 Cryptography Used In E-voting System 
In this chapter, we summarize related works on E-voting systems in terms of encryption 
algorithm.  Generally, researchers have categorized existing E-voting systems into three 
major types: blind signature based scheme, homorphic-based scheme, and mix-nets based 
scheme. 
Blind signature is a kind of digital signature that can be used in an E-voting system 
to better protect a voter’s privacy (Chaum, 1983), (Chien, 2001).   Several blind signature 
based E-voting systems have been proposed and the common main idea is to allow a 
signer (voter) to transmit any important voting message (ballot) anonymously. However, 
messages are only sealed and encrypted in one direction. It is not traceable in the sense if 
it is used in elections that a voter cannot reverse the encryption process when vote audit 
is needed. 
Homorphic cryptography is the second most popular encryption used in E-voting 
systems (Benaloh, 1987). It allows the cipher text to carry some specific computations 
before an encrypted message is generated. This message can later be decrypted and 
audited to see whether it matches the result of the same operations performed on the 
original plaintext.  
Consider an example in which the voter has two options {1,-1}, which stand for 
two different candidates in the race, and there are several voters casting their ballots in 
the election. The Homomorphic cryptography based scheme will calculate the sum of 
votes to determine the final result. If the sum of the votes for a specific candidate is larger 
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than 0, then this candidate is considered as the winner. Otherwise, this candidate will be 
considered as to concede the election. If there are more than two candidates or options in 
the election, then it is more complicated to determine the final result of the election by 
using the homomorphic based voting scheme. 
This type of scheme still exhibits drawbacks such as limited scalability; usually, 
it can accommodate only two options for voting, but a typical poll has more than two 
options. 
Mixnets allows messages to be encrypted with different servers and random 
patterns (Chaum, 1981). Ideally, it does not enforce a final encryption form except for an 
original encryption since the message could be encrypted infinitely.  
There are, however, various issues and technical challenges associated with each 
type of cryptographic methods mentioned above. They must be solved before they can be 
implemented in E-voting systems so that voters are confident enough to vote through the 
Internet. In addition, a summary of practical issues in E-voting procedure such as voting 
manipulation, voting fraud, data transferring through the Internet, and database 
maintenance are discussed (Jakobsson, 2004). Still, ideas from other designs may have 
the influence on the current and future trend of E-voting system development. 
2.2 Other Researchers’ Work 
Over the past two decades, there have been many papers focusing on E-voting issues as 
technological advances seem matured enough to warrant transition from traditional voting 
methods to electronic ones. Currently, the most widely used “Direct Recording 
Electronic” (DRE) voting system focuses on facilitating voters to cast paperless ballots 
on specific voting machines. In general, this type of new machines essentially replaces 
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paper ballots with electronic ones.  Other researchers are advocating for the Internet 
voting, and our works are also tailored for the Internet voting environment.  Several 
research works have focused on the voting security issues during the data encryption 
process. 
We will categorize other researchers’ work by analyzing the voting mechanism 
used in the voting procedure.  The typical design of a voting system can be categorized 
into paper ballot based, electronic machine based, and the Internet-based E-voting system. 
We focus on online E-voting activities because we believe that “vote through the Internet” 
will evolve into a normal life style soon in a similar way as online banking and online 
shopping that the public does nowadays. We also list several works from other researchers 
that may have some common properties regarding security and privacy concerns.  
Helios is the first online E-voting system and it is web based and offers the great 
flexibility for voters to vote online with open audit function (Adida, 2008). Every voter 
will be provided a tracking number to audit the result.  
The FOO system is composed of voter, authentication authority, and counting 
authority in the whole voting procedure (Fujioka, 1992).  This protocol also contains four 
phases: Initialization, Registration, Voting, and Counting phases. The author also claimed 
the vote check function can be achieved to ensure the vote verifiability.  
Punchscan is a kind of voting scheme while the ballot is designed with top and 
bottom sheet of a ballot (Chaum, 2006), (Popvenuic, 2006). This system provides a voter-
verifiable scheme to allow voters audit. The Pret a Voter Verification Election System has 
also suggested the idea of using the mix server cryptography for voters and public to 
randomly check and audit the ballot (Ryan, 2009). In reality, if every voter appears at the 
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voting booth and manually verifies and checks the plain ballot before casting, the total 
duration time of one voter in a voting booth will be longer than normal and will cause 
more delay and energy consumption in a large scale presidential election.  
The Threeballot system is a paper ballot based system that the whole voting 
system does not need any cryptography (Rivest, 2006).  If a voter selects a candidate, 
he/she will randomly fill two out of all three ballots for this candidate. Any candidate, 
who receives only one vote out of three ballots, is considered vetoed by this voter. This 
scheme has simplified the voting process but its lack of traceability does not meet the in-
time demand from voters in today’s democratic society. 
2.3 Clash Attack 
Besides the cryptography and voting process concerns we discussed above, the public 
also has concerns about corruption, fraudulent and manipulation from authorities in the 
election. Potential attacks from election authorities could be a big threat to true 
democracy.  Previously most researchers only consider risks from external factors such 
as voting system glitch, message transmission error, etc. We also consider issues related 
to the voting authorities that may happen. 
The concept of Clash attack on E-voting system was first introduced by (Kuesters, 
2011). It is a kind of attack that can undermine the verifiability in an election and it usually 
involves malicious authorities who want to manipulate the voting result. When an election 
is held through the Internet, the verifiability which is the basic requirement for running 
any modern E-voting system, becomes a very important security concern. Clash attack 
may occur and undermine the verifiability in the election and this kind of attack usually 
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involves malicious authorities that could manipulate the voting result without the public 
knowing.  It is one of the highly concerned attacks that have drawn great interest from 
many researchers in this field. Suppose there is at least one malicious authority that exists 
and actively participates in the election, if this malicious authority plays an important 
role, it may impact the voting result significantly.  The malicious authority can generate 
the same receipt to different voters during the vote casting phase. Meanwhile, it can safely 
replace any vote with its own favor and eventually can manipulate the election without 
being detected during the vote auditing phase. Thus, resolving this issue is another 
imperative requirement for setting up a modern E-voting system.  To demonstrate this, 
we will give a detailed example later to show how the malicious authority uses this kind 
of attack to manipulate the election voting result. Another possible attack from malicious 
authority will be discussed in Chapter 3.  
Consider the following scenario: 
Malicious authority such as VCC counts the vote with its favorite candidate even 
when voters have their vote receipt (confirmation number or tracking number) from the 
authority, it still could not prevent malicious behaviors happening because the authority 
can generate the duplicated receipt more than once to different voters when their votes 
are being inquired.  
When voters verify his/her own vote, since he/she has the same receipt as other 
voters, the result he/she checked might be that of another voter who has the exact same 
choices on candidates in the election, and his/her vote might not be actually counted. 
We need to set up a mechanism to enable voters to track their own votes and audit 
the voting result with great flexibility as well as anonymity. Thus how to balance between 
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traceability and anonymity is what we need to focus on. In our system, we introduce the 
concept of voting receipt with a confirmation number to serve for both tracking and clash 
attack prevention purpose. As we mentioned above, a voter casts their votes to the 
authority, VCC, along with a unique confirmation on each ballot.  The confirmations 
could be either generated from authorities’ pre-set pool or voters could revise them. 
During the ballot distribution phase, every voter is assigned a set of unique confirmations 
along with his/her assigned ballot and they can either accept or modify these pre-set 
confirmations. The confirmation used by voters must be unique throughout the whole E-
voting system, and the voter may apply that randomly on any assigned ballot. The unique 
confirmation chosen by the voters will be printed on every cast ballot upon casting. 
2.4 Basic Requirements for Setting Up an E-voting System 
Our integrated approach takes into account when there are untrustable authorities, 
untrustable systems and untrustable voters.  
The following important features must be absolutely provisioned for setting up a 
fair election: 
Anonymity: To maintain the anonymity of voters, the voting protocol must allow 
voters to request the ballot anonymously because authorities are not assumed to be 
trustworthy and in fact may violate the anonymity rule in the election. A malicious 
authority refers to any official entity such as Election Committee (EC), BDC or Vote 
Counting Committee (VCC) that might turn to be malicious in the election. With a 
malicious authority, if the voter requests the ballot by showing his/her identity, the ballot 
could be associated with this specific voter by the malicious BDC and eventually the 
voting content could be compromised. It is crucial that personal information exposure be 
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limited. In one of our E-voting system models, we use a ring signature based scheme 
during the ballot distribution phase.  We also respect both candidates’ and voters’ 
anonymity, and design a voting scheme that will dissociate each candidate and its 
corresponding vote on the ballot to keep candidates anonymous to possible malicious 
authority (VCC) during the vote counting phase, and keep voters anonymous to the 
possible malicious authority and the public during the ballot distribution and auditing 
phase. The E-voting schemes with different features will be further elaborated in Chapter 
3. 
Confidentiality: Who a voter voted for should be known to this specific voter 
only.  This principle must be mandatorily applied in any political election, and this basic 
election rule must be strictly obeyed by all authorities and E-voting system designers. In 
this dissertation, we have assumed untrusted or malicious authorities in the election, and 
they may unlawfully and secretly link a voter’s identity with his/her assigned ballot so 
that they could track the votes. This is an obvious consequence of protocol breach.  Our 
goal is to completely block any unauthorized association between voters and their 
corresponded votes to ensure confidential deliveries of the votes to the final tally.  
Verifiability: This refers to the match between any cast ballot and the 
corresponding voter’s record in the vote auditing phase. The step of vote verification and 
audit is much more stringent, as voters cast the vote and election authorities must 
accurately count the vote. Usually, two aspects of verifiability are defined,   individual 
verifiability and universal verifiability. Our E-voting system models can satisfy these two 
aspects of verifiability to allow voters to audit and verify both their own votes and the 
system-wide voting result easily. We have further detailed discussion in the later chapters. 
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Invariability: Although our previous works have well illustrated a fair election in 
terms of various security measurements, there are many remaining challenges throughout 
the whole voting process. For example, the voting protocol will be breached if a malicious 
authority manipulates the manifest of candidates’ permutation on each type of ballot to 
favor a certain candidate instead of changing the votes. It is important that in a Name and 
vote separated E-voting system, the permutation of candidates’ identities on each type of 
ballot should be fixed to stabilize a vote counting process for mapping all types of ballot 
and candidate identities during the whole election. Hence, our E-voting system models 
have incorporated the measurement to ensure the manifest of the candidates’ permutation 
is unchanged from the beginning to the end of the election.  We will discuss this kind of 
attack in Chapter 3.  
Efficiency: Every voter can independently and simultaneously obtain his/her 
ballot before voting, and thus the entire time frame for vote collecting and counting can 
be greatly shortened. In general, an Internet-based election held online can reduce 
required resources and complete the whole voting procedure easier than the one based on 
any other mediums.  
Multiple or repeated vote casting prevention: As the election is held through the 
Internet, the voting process must be able to prevent a voter from voting multiple times or 
voting repeatedly in different states (batches). A watchdog device is introduced in our 
proposed scheme can record and monitor voting transactions. This solution will be further 
elaborated in Chapter 3.  
From Chapter 3 onwards, the term “E-voting” specifically refers to the voting 
process being held through the Internet. 
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CHAPTER 3    
PROPOSED WORK AND OUR CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
This dissertation mainly focuses on safety concerns and practical problems arising from 
implementing an E-voting system. In this chapter, we will present our works by showing 
how different technologies and protocols are integrated into our designed E-voting system 
model.  Since the E-voting system is a complicated system, any breach in any phase in 
terms of voting data, security, voter privacy, voter anonymity and voting accuracy will 
eventually ruin the whole election, and thus we have to consider every detail in the 
process to ensure the operation is secure. In each section, specific measurements are 
applied to ensure a secured and accurate voting process and will address all safety issues 
and concerns as discussed in the previous chapter.  
We will first illustrate terms and technologies used in our proposed schemes in 
the paper ballot based mode. Our proposed idea will also work in electronic mode.  
Note that the variable definitions used in each section are independent of other 
sections. 
3.1 Name and Vote Separated E-voting system (NOTE) 
It is necessary to disassociate the candidate and the voter’s vote to ensure the anonymity 
of candidates because election authorities are considered potentially malicious. If a 
candidate is associated with a vote on the ballot received at the VCC side, there could be 
an obvious weakness that can be exploited by the malicious VCC in the vote counting 
phase.  Punchscan and Voter Pret may have the similar ballot form with the one in our 
proposed system but our research work presents the ballot in a different way as it features 
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voter’s self-decision power and ballot simplicity. We list a series of sample ballots in 
Figure 3.1. There are β candidates and φ types of ballot (1≤ |φ|≤ β!), and β checkboxes.  
The checkbox on each row on the ballot indicates whether this associated candidate is 
voted for or not. Here, we set β to 3 and φ to 6 (3!). Then six types of ballots corresponding 
to six unique permutations of a three-candidate race. Every ballot is distinguished by a 
marker (indicated by the blackened area on the top right side of a ballot) that is not visible 
to voters nor VCC (who can only see the type of the ballot in an encrypted form). This 
marker represents the type of the ballot and it can be numbers or letters depending on the 
encryption method.  Figure 3.2 shows the ballots after they have been marked and the 
ballots are torn into two parts. The main purpose of using this type of ballots is allowing 
candidates to be anonymous when the vote is collected and counted by VCC in the vote 
counting phase.  
We will illustrate a kind of attack while all ballots in the election only contain a 
fixed permutation of candidates without applying the Name and Vote separated voting 
scheme: If VCC is malicious and even if the vote is not shown with a candidate, when 
VCC counts votes of a candidate who is not a favorite of VCC, since the candidate 
permutation is fixed, VCC can easily locate this specific candidate’s vote on the casted 
ballot and might have a chance to change or manipulate it during the vote counting phase. 
No matter how many percentages of total votes could be successfully altered by malicious 
authority VCC, the true and fair democracy has been breached. This is a form of attack to 
be deterred by applying the Name and Vote Separated E-voting scheme. 
This scheme is suitable for voting through the Internet since the ballot separation 
procedure can be easily achieved digitally. The proposed scheme is distributed, has a 
17 
 
 
 
collusion-resistant mechanism for E-voting and is capable of maintaining the voters’ 
confidentiality.  We require that EC and VCC are independent of each other. EC and VCC 
will never be in collaboration or coercion.  For example, in a U.S. presidential election, 
the two major parties can take the responsibility of EC and VCC separately, or the two 
parties will supervise EC and VCC together. At this moment, we will discuss further 
serious situations in the later charters. 
There are numbers of differences between NOTE and other existing schemes such 
as punchscan and three-ballots voting system:  
 NOTE is based on the Internet voting media where as punchscan is designed for 
the DRE voting system which uses machine-scan paper ballots. The three-ballot scheme 
is also based on the paper ballot mode.  
In punchscan and three-ballot voting scheme, there is only one official Election 
Authority (EA) that supervises the whole voting procedure. EA is also in charge of 
distributing ballots, collecting vote and counting the final tally.  NOTE has two different 
and independent authorities, EC and VCC, the role of EC and VCC is very important in 
the voting procedure. They are independent and can monitor to each other.  
The voters and the candidates in the punchscan and three-ballot scheme are partial 
auditors for the election; EA will generate at least twice the number of ballots in the 
election. There is also a pre-election step allowing the voters and the candidates to check 
the ballot. This feature is probably not needed for the Internet voting which NOTE uses 
since the data transaction will be at least doubled than it is expected.  The goal of NOTE 
is to protect candidate’s anonymity, reduce internet traffic during voting and offer the 
same secure level as provided by the traditional paper ballot mode and DRE mode.  
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Another serious issue is that the most of existing E-voting machines and their 
source codes are not published.  The public has concerns about whether the voting 
procedure is really fair and transparent or not, and how the particular type of E-voting 
system is chosen. Is there any political reason or pressure in the decision of the committee 
in choosing a particular voting machine? This is another important reason we need to 
introduce NOTE.  Because the candidate identity can be well protected through this 
protocol since it is disassociated the relationship between the candidates in the race and 
their received vote during the vote counting phase. 
To make it easier to follow, we will illustrate the operation of our model with the 
paper ballot mode first and then we will discuss the same procedure in the E-voting mode. 
Consider a small class election that Alice, Bob and Charlie are the candidates for the 
president of the student association. There are several identified students as voters in the 
classroom; two students are in charge of counting the votes. We do not know whether 
these two students are good friends of Alice, Bob, or Charlie. We assume these two 
students who play the role of VCC are not 100% trustable. Since we have three 
candidates, there are 3! permutations in ordering the candidates on the ballot. The teacher 
may generate more than 3! ballots, each displaying one of the 3! permutations with a 
marker. For illustrative purposes and to be able to resolve possible contention in the final 
tally counting process, the teacher generates 3! distinct ballots as shown in Figure 3.1, 
and gives each voter one plain ballot. 
Figure 3.1 shows the six possible ordering of the candidates’ names on each ballot; 
there is also a hidden marker (covered with the black area) on every ballot to 
indicate/index the type of the ballot.  Each type of ballots may use a set of distinct 
19 
 
 
 
markers. If there are n candidates for the election, there will be n! different types of 
ballots. When a voter casts his/her votes, the voter must separate the ballot into two parts 
as shown in Figure 3.2 and 3.3. Then, voters should submit the right part of the ballot as 
shown in Figure 3.3 to the two students acting as VCC to count the votes (the types of the 
ballots are hidden, and still remain unknown at this time). Voters also give the left part of 
the ballot to the teacher to collect. After receiving all right-part of ballots, these two 
students who are in charge of counting will unveil the hidden marker of every ballot as 
shown in Figure 3.4. Since the ballots being counted do not contain the candidates’ names, 
implying that they do not know the names of candidates 1, 2 and 3. These two students 
only tabulate how many votes are for each candidate (1, 2 and 3; names of candidates 
remain anonymous) in each type of ballots. When this step is completed, the two students 
will pass the tally results of votes for each type of ballots to the teacher. The teacher will 
reveal the hidden marker of each type of ballot, and calculate the final result for each 
candidate. Note that we may actually have more than six distinct hidden marker types 
while there are several ones referring to a same sequence of candidates which is one type 
of the six (3!) in total.  
The novelty of this scheme is that the ballot is separated into two parts; one part 
contains the list of the candidates in some random order (the identification of this order 
is hidden), and the other one is for the choice from voters. Note that each ballot is counted 
by VCC on the voter’s choice and the sequence type, and the candidate names and other 
information are not revealed to VCC. 
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Figure 3.1 Sample ballots for a three candidate race. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Left part of the ballots with candidate names. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Right part of the ballots with vote choice. 
1. Alice 
2. Bob 
1 
3. Charlie 
2 
3 
1. Bob 
2. Alice 
1 
3. Charlie 
2 
3 
1. Charlie 
2. Alice 
1 
3. Bob 
2 
3 
1. Alice 
2. Charlie 
1 
3. Bob 
2 
3  
1. Bob 
2. Charlie 
1 
3. Alice 
2 
3 
1. Charlie 
2. Bob 
1 
3. Alice 
2 
3 
1. Alice 
2. Bob 
3. Charlie 
 
1 
2 
3 
A
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Figure 3.4 Ballots with marker type revealed  
when two students count the vote. 
 
The procedure in the Internet voting mode of the proposed E-voting scheme 
(Figure 3.5) can be summarized as follows.  
EC receives the registration from a voter; it will verify and determine whether the 
voter is eligible to receive a ballot to vote. After the verification, EC sends an encrypted 
ballot through the Internet to the voter.  The original format of the ballot prior to 
encryption is { t,c }, where the array [n])[2][1]( ,...,c,cc=c  denotes the names of the 
candidates, t    denotes the marker which determines the type of the ballot, and n is the 
number of candidates running for the election. 
We use the RSA algorithm (note that other encryption may be adopted) to encrypt 
all data for transmission (Chien, 2001).  Then, EC sends the encrypted ballot {C ,T} to 
the voter where [n])],....2[],1[( CCC=C ; at the voter side, they can use the public key to 
recover array c by decrypting C, but the marker T remains hidden.  
After casting the vote, the binary array [n])[2],...,[1],( DDD=D  will be generated by 
the voter’s choices. A “1” stands for voting for YES; a “0” stands for voting for  NO. The 
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information of the voter ID (“voted” ack) will be sent to EC, and EC will record the status 
of the specific voter ID as “voted”; this is the most important information for the database 
at EC to prevent double voting during the election. Receipt L will be generated which is 
used for the voter to track his/her voting in the final voting tally. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5 The block diagram of the voting procedure in NOTE. 
 
The data array D, marker T, and receipt L will be sent to VCC. VCC will use the 
key to decrypt the array D, but they do not have the key to decrypt the hidden marker T. 
That is, they cannot identify the type of the ballot; the next step is to calculate the vote 
tally for each choice with the same type of ballot.  
VCC submits the final tally of every type of ballots. After collecting the results of 
each type of ballots, the tally of each type of ballots will be published to the voters first. 
At this time, the voters still do not know the exact result since the candidates’ names are 
still unknown with the encrypted marker T. Then, the EC reveals the marker T on every 
ballot, and calculates the final tally of the votes according to the candidate names. In this 
case, nobody can change or undermine the result that is published already. 
The numeric result of each type of ballot is shown in Table 3.1. 
  EC 
(c[1],c[2]….c[n],t) 
Voter 
(c[1],c[2],…..c[n],T) 
       VCC 
Sending ballot as  (C[1],C[2]……C[n], T) 
Sending “voted” ack  
Voter registration 
Sending encrypted voted ballot  
((D[1],D[2]…….D[n]), T, L) 
Sending tally without candidate list 
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Table 3.1 Voting Result of Each Type of Ballots 
 
 Choice 1 Choice 2 Choice 3 
A 12 13 4 
B 1 12 21 
C 7 13 8 
D 6 11 4 
E 5 10 12 
F 10 5 6 
    
 
 
After this result is published, the teacher will reveal the exact name ordering as 
shown in Table 3.2. 
The final election result shows that Alice gets 61 votes, Bob 36 votes, and Charlie 
63 votes. 
We will describe the mathematical formulation of our proposed method for voters 
and candidates’ confidentiality. 
Denote [n])[2],...,[1],( ccc=c as the list of candidates where  is the number of 
candidates, and [i]c  is a string representing the name of the candidates. 
Denote  as the marker on the ballot, where  is a set of sequence numbers, 
and  is greater than !n . 
Finally, EC generates two sets of data, the ballot identification along with the 
corresponding list of candidates. Then, EC encrypts array c and marker  with different 
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keys. 
 
Table 3.2 Voting Result of Each Type of Ballots after Revealing the Names of 
Candidates 
 
 
 Alice Bob Charlie 
A 12 13 4 
B 12 1 21 
C 13 8 7 
D 6 4 11 
E 12 5 10 
F 6 5 10 
 
Let 
, qhp = , 
where w , y , q and h  are large numbers. 
Let )1)(1( −−= ywα , )1)(1( −−= hqβ  
We will also find r >1 which is coprime to α, and s >1 coprime to β, and choose 
'r and 's  satisfying the following: 
1)mod'( =αrr , 1)mod'( =βss , 
where  )1'( −rr  can be evenly divided by α, and )1'( −ss  can be evenly divided by β. 
The data t  and ][mc are encrypted by the RSA algorithm as follows: 
ztT r mod=  
[ ] [ ] modsC m c m p= , 
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where nm ,...,3,2,1= , T   and ][mC  are the encrypted data received at the voter side, and its 
private key and public key are all held by EC; the system will automatically filter this 
factor and the voter can only read the vote option and cast his/her votes accordingly.  
After casting the vote, the system will send the vote ),[n],],...,2[],1[( LTDDD with 
the value of marker  to VCC. ),[n],],...,2[],1[( LTDDD=D is an array of binary value 
generated by the system at the voter side, where “0” means voting NO, and “1” means 
voting YES. L is the voter’s verification key to let the voter verify his/her vote in the final 
result that whether the vote is counted already.   
When VCC receives the array D, it will count the tally of the votes with the same 
group of T. 
It will be decrypted with  
pmDmd s mod][][
'
=  
While VCC does not have the private key of , 
),])[],...,2[],1[(( TndddRT ∑=  
),)][],...,2[],1[(( Tnddd∑ ∑ ∑=  
)),(( TLQT ∑=  
Here,  is the tally of the ballot whose marker is T with the same permutation. 
∑ ])[],...,2[],1[( nddd  means the sum of each option’s votes. After the counting procedure, 
each   with the same group of marker T will be re-transmitted to the public board or 
EC; the public will get the tally results while T still remains encrypted. The next step is 
to publish the tally result; EC will use the private key of  to decrypt  . 
Then, it will count the final tally by comparing the value of the marker  with the matched 
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candidate list.  is the database created for the voters’ information, and the voters may 
check and verify the cast votes at EC.  
When the marker of each type of ballots is clarified and published, the whole tally 
summary can be calculated accurately by EC under the public supervision. 
As explained, we have addressed the problem exhibited during recent elections in 
the past few years. The proposed method ensures voters and candidates’ confidentiality, 
safeguarding fair democratic election. 
NOTE will prevent problems caused by malfunctions at the E-voting system with 
a centralized vote counting authority. It is a novel distributed election model. EC and 
VCC are independent of each other to ensure absolute fairness. In past elections, many 
contentions happened during the vote counting period, and people always have the 
concern on something unknown either in the voting machine or the software.  NOTE has 
mitigated both of these concerns with decentralized counting procedure to ensure the 
absolute independence and voters and candidates’ confidentiality. 
 
3.2 Enhanced Name and Vote Separated E-voting system (E-NOTE) 
E-NOTE provides an extra measurement to ensure the accuracy of the vote tallying results 
that would prevent VCC from malicious behaviors. Besides the issues addressed in NOTE, 
many other issues emerge while the election is held through the Internet.  
 Voter confidentiality is one of the biggest concerns in elections and many 
researchers have explored this issue for a long time. If EC colludes and shares the ballot 
distribution information to other authorities, then voter confidentiality may be 
compromised. If EC is corrupted, it can form the relationship between a ballot and a 
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specific voter who cast the vote. Typical voting model endows the responsibility of the 
election authority including registration, vote counting and vote tally. We delegate Ballot 
Distribution Center (BDC) to be solely responsible for ballot distribution, which is 
necessary to disassociate the link between voter’s identity and his/her distributed ballot.  
BDC, VCC, and EC are independent of each other, and our proposed scheme prevents 
them from collusion. Besides BDC, we define several distinguished phases more 
specifically in the E-voting procedure as follows: voter registration, ballot distribution, 
voter casting, ballot collecting, vote counting, vote tally publishing and vote auditing. 
Comparing with NOTE, E-NOTE improves two levels of privacy measurements 
to reduce the risk of voter privacy leakage, collusion among voting authorities, and 
mistaken vote counts. Meanwhile, E-NOTE provides a new platform to ensure a fair E-
voting environment to address voter fraud issue. In order to prevent voters from disputing 
their votes, we introduce a hardware called watchdog device to record all voting 
transactions at voters’ end. The watchdog device is issued by EC when the voter registers 
and get verified to vote at EC. 
We illustrate E-NOTE scheme with an example of using paper ballots to help 
readers understand the concept of the scheme and the different from NOTE.  Figure 3.6 
shows the flow of information between voters and voting authorities. There are three 
election authorities: EC, BDC, and VCC. The responsibility of BDC is separating the 
ballot distribution duty from EC. The EC certifies the voter’s eligibility and issues 
him/her an electronic certificate, and the voter can obtain the ballot from BDC using EC’s 
electronic certificate instead of voters’ identity. Other than the certificate, a voter does 
not need to show any identification to BDC and obtains the ballot anonymously. There is 
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no linkage between the certificate and the voter’s identity. Hence, this method ensures 
voter confidentiality and privacy.  
 
 
Figure 3.6 The block diagram of the voting procedure in E-NOTE. 
 
The watchdog device records all data transactions carried out during the voting 
process (certificate request and issuance, ballot request and issuance, and vote 
submission), thereby eliminating the possibility of voter frauds, such as requesting the 
ballot or voting more than once. 
For example, voter Jessica is one of the voters in a small class to vote; the voting 
procedure conducted in E-NOTE for her can be described as follows:  
Step 1: Jessica goes to A1 for registration where she receives a certificate card 
from A1.  
Step 2: Jessica goes to A2 and shows her certification card.  Note that Jessica does 
not have to show her identity to A2. A2 generates more than 3! types of ballots (since we 
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have 3 candidates), and each ballot has one of these 6 (3! ) permutations and a marker 
indicating its type. A2 checks Jessica’s certification card to verify that she is eligible to 
vote and that her thumb is not marked (indicating she has not voted, and this is equivalent 
to recording the transaction in the watchdog device). When that is confirmed, Jessica 
receives the ballot and gets her thumb marked (the mark simply indicates Jessica has 
received the ballot and is assumed to remain intact during the whole election). The first 
two steps are used to protect voter confidentiality and privacy as there is no linkage 
between the certificate and the ballot.   
Step 3: The ballot has a carbon copy, and when Jessica marks and submits her 
ballot, the carbon copy is retained by her (this is equivalent to recording the transaction 
in the watchdog device). The main purpose of this step is to prevent voter frauds.  If 
Jessica claims there is a problem with her vote, she can use the carbon copy of her ballot 
to seek help from authorities for further investigation. In the E-voting mode, the watchdog 
device is used to record all the transactions in the voting process. 
Step 4: This is similar to the step discussed in NOTE, Jessica tears the ballot into 
two parts and casts them into two different boxes. The part containing Jessica’s vote is 
given to A3 and the part containing the candidate’s name is given to A1.  
Step 5: A3 counts the received ballots once the voting is completed. Since there 
are 3! types of ballots and the ballots do not contain the candidates’ names, A3 only tallies 
the results based on the ballot type.  
Step 6: A3 publishes the tally results of each type of ballots to the public on the 
blackboard and passes these results to A1.  
Step 7: A1 reveals the candidate’s name for each type of ballots, and the final 
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count for each candidate is obtained. 
Next, we illustrate the mathematical formulation of E-NOTE. Suppose there are n 
voters and w candidates: 
Ai: Voter i’s batch code  
Bi: Voter i’s date of birth 
Ui: Voter i’s identity number 
Gi: Voter i’s gender 
Di: Voter i’s choice  
Ci: Candidate’s name where i is from 1 to n. 
M: the certificate given to voters by EC; the voter needs to show this certificate to 
BDC to obtain the ballot from BDC. 
 
Let   r r’ mod (p-1) = 1 and s s’ mod (p-1) = 1 
where p is a large prime number and r is in the range from 1 to (p-1) with gcd(r, p-1) = 1. 
We denote r as the private key of EC and r’ as the corresponding decryption key of EC. 
Denote s as the private key of voter i, and s is in the range from 1 to (p-1) with gcd(s, p-
1) = 1. s’ is the corresponding decryption key of voter i.  
Step 1: Voter i sends data array (Ui, Gi, Bi, Ai) to EC for registration. After EC’s 
verification, EC uses the three-pass encryption algorithm and sends the message: 
(E (r, M), F) = ( rM mod p, F )                                          
to Voter i. Before the election, the authorities will initialize every watchdog device with 
a set of data. These data are used for securing and monitoring voters’ online voting 
behaviors. F is used for the watchdog device to verify that this packet is really from EC, 
and E(.,.) is the encryption function. This step shows that EC sends the certificate M to 
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Voter i. If F matches the data stored in the watchdog device which is used for verifying 
the packet authenticity, the voting process can proceed. The voter does not have access 
to information in the watchdog device; only the authority can review and check the 
watchdog device upon request. 
 Voter i receives the packet from EC, and encrypts it with his/her own private key 
s, resulting in the following data:   
 (E(s, E(r, M)), F) = (E(r, E(s, M)), F)= ( srM )( mod p, F) = ( rsM mod p, F)                                                                                          
This is sent back to EC to decode the packet with its key r’ by the decryption function 
Z(.,.). 
Z(r’, E(r, (s, M))) = E(s, M) = sM  mod p                        
Denote Φ as the shared key from BDC to EC; Φ is in the range from 1 to p-1 with gcd(v, 
p-1) = 1 and v’ is the corresponding decryption key of BDC. Then, EC uses the BDC’s 
shared key v to encrypt the certificate again, and the certificate becomes. 
E(Φ, E(s, M)) = ΦsM mod p                                              
Finally, EC sends this certificate to the voter again.  
Step 2:  Voter i receives and decodes the certificate with his/her key s’ as      
Z(s’, ΦsM mod p ) = ΦM mod p = E(Φ, M)                          
and then sends E(Φ, M) to BDC to show that he/she has the certificate from EC, and it 
is encrypted with the key that is only shared between BDC and EC.  
BDC uses the same method to decode  
Z(Φ’, E(Φ, M)) = 'ΦΦM mod p = M                                   
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Then, BDC distributes one ballot to Voter i. This protects the voter’s identity.  
Step 3: Denote c[i] as the name of the ith candidate and the array c = (c[1], c[2], …, 
c[w]) as the packet containing the list of names of all the candidates. Denote Xt∈  as the 
marker on the ballot, where 1,2,X =   is a set of sequential numbers, and X  is greater 
than w!. 
BDC generates two sets of data, the ballot identification along with the list of 
candidates. BDC encrypts the array c and marker  with different keys. 
Let 
)1')(1( −−= kkα , )1')(1( −−= yyβ  
where 'kkz = , 'yyq = , and ykk ,', and 'y  are large numbers. 
We choose α<< h1 and β<< v1  such that   and 1),gcd( =βv  .  'h and 'v  
are chosen so that they satisfy the following: 
1)mod'( =αhh  and  1)mod'( =βvv , 
where h’ and v’ are  the multiplicative inverse of  αmodh and   βmodv , respectively.  
The marker t  and the array c are encrypted as follows: 
αmodhtT =                                               
βmod])[(][ viciC =                                          
where wi ,...,2,1= , T  and  are the encrypted data received at the voter side with 
different keys, h and v, respectively. BDC holds both the private key exponent h’ and the 
public key exponent h, i.e., VCC cannot decrypt the marker T.  
Step 4: After the voter submits the vote, the system sends the vote packet 
),],[],...,2[],1[( LTwDDD  with the value of marker  to VCC. The array D is encrypted 
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with the public key exponent v. It is a binary array generated by the system at the voter 
side and can be decrypted at the VCC side with the VCC’s private key v’.  L is the voter’s 
voting receipt to let the voter verify his/her vote to ensure that the vote is counted 
properly.   
Step 5: VCC receives and decrypts the array D, and then the votes are tallied for 
each type of ballot based on T. The array D is decrypted as follows:  
βmod][][ 'viDid =  
where i is from 1 to w. 
While VCC does not have the private key h’, 
),])[],...,2[],1[(( TwdddTALLYT ∑=  
),)][],...,2[],1[(( Twddd∑ ∑ ∑=                                   
)),(( TLVERT ∑=  
Here, TTALLY  is the tally of the ballots with the same marker T. ∑ ])[],...,2[],1[( wddd  
represents the sum of the votes for every candidate, i.e.,  
( [1], [2],..., [ ])d d d w∑ ∑ ∑  
where [ ]d j∑  represents the number of votes casted for candidate j. For example, if there 
are three types of ballots with the sequences of candidates “Alice, Bob, Charlie”, “Alice, 
Charlie, Bob” and “Charlie, Alice, Bob”. VCC will summarize the result of each 
individual type of ballots with the same sequence which is marked by T.  
∑ ∑ ∑ ][],...,2[],1[ wddd  shows the number of votes that each candidate receives for one type 
of ballot.  TVER  will be stored in a database used for the voting receipt storage. It allows 
voters to visit and track the votes they have voted. 
34 
 
 
 
Step 6: After VCC finishes counting the votes, each  TTALLY  with the same 
marker T is published to the public and transmitted to EC.  
Step 7: EC uses the private key to decrypt αmod'hTt =  and tallies the final 
results. 
When the content of the marker for each ballot type is reviewed and published, 
the final votes can be tallied accurately by EC under the public’s scrutiny. 
Since E-NOTE is set up to prevent VCC or other possible hackers from changing 
the vote results. Consider an example that the malicious authorities/hackers are trying to 
subvert or change the election voting results under the table.  
We define x as the event that the malicious authority or the hacker guessed the 
location of their favorite candidate on the ballot correctly.  Define P(x) as the probability 
that this can be done. If there are w candidates, then there are w outcomes for this event 
and P(x) is 1/w.   
We define y as the event that the malicious authority or the hacker guessed the 
sequence of candidates on the ballot correctly. Define P(y) as the probability that this can 
be done and there are w! types of the ballot, and therefore 
𝑃𝑃(𝑦𝑦) = 1
𝑤𝑤!                                                              
The entropy of X and Y,  
𝐻𝐻(𝑋𝑋) = −∑ 𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥) log   𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥)𝑤𝑤                                 
𝐻𝐻(𝑌𝑌) = −∑ 𝑝𝑝(𝑦𝑦) log  𝑝𝑝(𝑦𝑦)𝑤𝑤!                                              
Using the definition in information theory, we know that the mutual information 
relationship is as follows:  
35 
 
 
 
𝐼𝐼(𝑋𝑋,𝑌𝑌) = 𝐻𝐻(𝑌𝑌) − 𝐻𝐻(𝑌𝑌|𝑋𝑋)                                    
𝐼𝐼(𝑋𝑋,𝑌𝑌) = 𝐻𝐻(𝑋𝑋) − 𝐻𝐻(𝑋𝑋|𝑌𝑌)   
From our definition and assumption, if the permutation of the list of candidates on 
the ballot is guessed successfully by VCC or other hackers, then VCC’s favorite 
candidate’s position on the ballot will be known. The conditional entropy is: 
H(X|Y) =0                                                             
This conditional entropy is 0 since the order of the candidates on the ballot is 
already known.  
 From the relationship between the mutual information and conditional entropy: 
I(X,Y)=H(X)-H(X|Y)                                             
I(X,Y)=H(Y)-H(Y|X)                                             
Since H(X|Y)=0, 
H(Y)-H(Y|X)=H(X)                                              
H(Y|X)=H(Y)-H(X)                                              
From above, we have:  
𝐻𝐻(𝑌𝑌|𝑋𝑋) = 𝐻𝐻(𝑌𝑌) − 𝐻𝐻(𝑋𝑋)                                    
= −�𝑝𝑝(𝑦𝑦) log  𝑝𝑝(𝑦𝑦)
𝑤𝑤! − �−�𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥) log 𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥)𝑤𝑤 � 
             = 𝑤𝑤 ∗ 1
𝑤𝑤
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙
1
𝑤𝑤
− 𝑤𝑤! ∗ 1
𝑤𝑤! 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 1𝑤𝑤! 
            =𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 1
𝑤𝑤
− log 1
𝑤𝑤! = 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙  (𝑤𝑤 − 1)! 
Figure 3.7 shows the relationship between the number of candidates and the 
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conditional entropy. The conditional entropy can be interpreted as how likely the 
malicious authority VCC or the hackers can guess the permutation of the candidates set 
on the ballot if the position of their favorite candidate on the ballot is known. The number 
of candidates varies from 2 to 50 in Figure 3.7 and a larger value in the conditional entropy 
indicates there is more uncertainty in determining the permutation of the candidates on 
the ballot.   
Consider the special case when there are only 2 candidates running in the election, 
i.e., w=2. When VCC or the hackers guessed the position of their favorite candidate 
successfully on one ballot, the position of the other candidate on the ballot is also known. 
This means that the conditional entropy H(Y|X)=0 as shown in Figure 3.7. 
In large-scale elections where there are a large number of ballots, we can consider 
the probability of picking any ballot type as being equal. If we have ƞ types of the ballot, 
the probability of any specific type ballot being selected is 1/ ƞ.  
 
 
Figure 3.7 The relationship between the number 
of candidates and the conditional entropy. 
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Consider the case that the malicious authority VCC or the hacker guessed their 
favorite candidate on one of the ballots successfully. When the malicious authority or the 
hacker obtains the next ballot, the event 𝜏𝜏 is defined as the successful guess on the next 
ballot and the probability P(τ)  of guessing successfully the same candidate is: 
𝑃𝑃(𝜏𝜏) = 1
𝑤𝑤! ∗ 1 + �1 − 1𝑤𝑤!� ∗ 1𝑤𝑤 
 = 1
𝑤𝑤! + �𝑤𝑤! − 1𝑤𝑤! � ∗ 1𝑤𝑤 
= 𝑤𝑤 + 𝑤𝑤! − 1
𝑤𝑤! ∗ 𝑤𝑤  
 
A plot of Equation above is shown in Figure 3.8. The values of P(τ) for selected 
values of w are tabulated as Table 3.3. 
In the worst case scenario where the cryptography method has been hacked by the 
malicious authority or the hacker, our E-NOTE scheme can still protect the candidate’s 
privacy.  P(τ) will drop from 1 to 0.04 if there are 25 candidates in the election. 
Besides the candidates for the presidency, a national election ballot will have 
candidates of senators, governors and local officers.  The total number of choices in a 
ballot can be around 25 and we can add another 25 more “virtual candidates” in the actual 
communication packet to decrease the probability of being guessed to 0.02. Voters will 
not see the “virtual candidate” while they vote and this will enhance the security in the 
election. 
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Table 3.3 Comparison Table on Different w Affecting to the Probability P(τ) 
W P(τ) 
5 0.26 
10 0.10 
20 0.05 
25 0.04 
30 0.03 
50 0.02 
 
 
Figure 3.8 The relationship between P(τ) and w. 
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3.3 Three-pass Based Enhanced Name and Vote Separated E-voting System 
The three-pass algorithm is a kind of encryption used for two parties’ communication. In 
the voter registration phase, EC receives the registration request from the voter; EC 
verifies and determines whether the voter is eligible to receive the certificate. EC uses a 
three-pass cryptographic algorithm to encrypt the certificate and sends it to the voter.  The 
voter uses a three-pass cryptographic algorithm to encrypt the certificate with his/her own 
key. Then, the voter sends the encrypted certificate (which is encrypted twice with 
different keys from EC and the voter) back to EC. When EC receives the encrypted 
certificate from the voter, EC decodes it with the voter’s own key and then applies the 
BDC’s key (which is only shared by EC and BDC) on the encrypted certificate, and sends 
it back to the voter again.  The voter receives the certificate and uses her own key to 
decode the encrypted message. After this step, the certificate is only encrypted by the 
BDC’s key. The voter sends the encrypted certificate which is only encrypted with the 
BDC’s key to BDC. BDC uses its private key to decode the certificate and verify the 
certificate is from EC. If the verification is positive, the voter is eligible to receive a ballot. 
This procedure could well protect voters’ identity from being leaked if the voting 
authority is malicious. 
 
Figure 3.9 The block diagram of the ballot distributing process in three-pass 
cryptography based E-voting system. 
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3.4 Ring Signature Based Enhanced Name and Vote Separated 
E-voting System (RE-NOTE) 
 
The ring signature algorithm is designed to allow a group member to sign a message 
anonymously among the whole group. There are several possible signers and one actual 
signer to form a valid ring signature. The actual signer is the member who signed the 
signature in the whole group, the possible signer is the member who did not sign the 
signature but belongs to this specific group with the actual signer. Although the actual 
signer is anonymous, he/she still can be identically recognized to this certain group. 
According to the definition of the ring signature, the verification function must be a one 
to one collision-free mapping function. In the ballot distribution phase in RE-NOTE, we 
set a group of voters to create a ring signature.  
We need to emphasize that the ring signature scheme is similar to the group 
signature scheme except that the former one has no group manager.  The advantage of the 
ring signature is that no centralized controller is involved in the signature. If we 
incorporate a group manager to form a signature in the scheme, there will be another 
potential concern about trustworthiness since we consider the reality that the election 
authorities are not fully trustable.  Ring signature is pretty well suitable for our work RE-
NOTE during the ballot distribution phase since it can provision voters’ anonymity and 
overcome the complicated situation when there is a corrupted or malicious authority 
involved in the whole voting procedure during the election.  
An E-voting scheme not equipped with the ring signature may result in the 
following attack scenario: Voter Jack is being verified at EC and is going to BDC to get 
a ballot. If BDC is malicious and Jack does not make himself anonymous, BDC could 
track Jack’s assigned ballot and get to know the content of Jack’s vote. This obviously 
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ruins the privacy and confidentiality policy of any political election.  By applying ring 
signature, it is more secure for voter Jack to show his eligibility rather than his identity to 
request a plain ballot from BDC. 
The Ring signature scheme is designed to allow a group of members to sign 
messages while remaining anonymous among the whole group. For the ballot distribution 
procedure in RE-NOTE, the following assumptions are made: 
Suppose we have l members in a group to create the ring signature.  Permutation 
on each input: for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ l, for any fixed and distinct value of all the inputs 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖, 
the verification function 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖(), and the value rv is one to one mapping plus collision-free 
from the input 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 to the output 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖 which means we will get a unique output with each 
different input. Neither voting authorities nor voters are fully trustable. This model can 
prevent authorities’ fraud from among them, including the clash attack, and it has other 
advanced features such as voter identity recognition. The ring signature and RSA are the 
main cryptographic methods used in RE-NOTE. 
The basic operation procedure of the ring signature scheme is described below: 
There are l members forming a group to perform a ring signature. Each member 
of the group has a pair of keys, public key (Pki) and private key (Ski): (𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃1, 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃1), 
(𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃2, 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃2),…. (𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙, 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙).  A group member 𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠, can create a signature rv by using the ring 
signature cryptography. Under the definition of ring signature, anyone may check the 
validity of a ring signature by using the signature rv, the message m, and the public keys 
involved 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃1,𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃2, … ,𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙 .  
Here we need to clarify the notion of the actual signer and the possible signer.  
The actual signer is a signer of the signature on a message m, and the possible signers are 
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a set of members in the ring group who may sign the signature. Each signature will be 
signed by one actual signer only, and this actual signer belongs to a group of several 
possible signers.  
Denote the group with l members to form a ring signature scheme. Each group 
member  𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖  has the public key 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  to form a function f (.). Since each member   𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖  has 
its own private key   𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖   , this member is the only one who knows how to get the reverse 
function: 𝑓𝑓−1(. )   
1) Generating a group signature:  
The actual signer: member 𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠 is given the message m and a set of public keys 
from the other members in the group: 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃1,𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃2, … .𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙 .  
𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠  picks a random value rv, uniformly-distributed in {0,1}, also randomly picks 
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 as a generator for all the other ring members 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖  (1≤i≤l, i≠s), then computes:  
                                  )( ii xfy =  
Since there is a unique value 𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠 that satisfied the equation 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖(𝑦𝑦1,,𝑦𝑦2,𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠, … ,𝑦𝑦𝑙𝑙) = 
rv, where 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖() is the function used for the verification step.  rv is the initialization value 
since we already know 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 (1≤i≤l, i≠s).    
Once 𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠 is calculated and found, an actual signer 𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠 can compute:  
)(1 ss yfx
−=  
2) Form the ring signature: 
The ring signature will be signed with the format below: 
(𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃1,𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃2, … .𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙, rv , 𝑥𝑥1, 𝑥𝑥2, … 𝑥𝑥𝑠𝑠 … . 𝑥𝑥𝑙𝑙 ,𝑚𝑚) 
3) Check the signature:  
Any verifier can verify an alleged signature on the message as follows: 
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Apply the function f (.).  to compute  )( ii xfy =    for each i=1,2,…l,: 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖(𝑦𝑦1,,𝑦𝑦2,𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠, … ,𝑦𝑦𝑙𝑙) = rv 
If the equation above is satisfied, the verifier accepts the signature as valid. 
During the ballot distribution phase, we assume there is a group of several voters 
creating the ring signature, according to the definition of the ring signature, the 
verification function ψ(.) which is used for verification purpose is a one to one mapping 
with collision-free function. 
We focus on one of the basic foundations of a fair election which is to maintained 
voters confidentiality and anonymity. In the past years, many researchers have explored 
this topic on different levels. The goal of our research is to setup an E-voting model for 
the future. The voter’s confidentiality and vote verification are two of the most important 
issues and challenges in elections. If EC and BDC collude and share the ballot distribution 
information, then voter’s confidentiality can be compromised. If the EC is corrupted, the 
relationship between voters and a specific ballot for each voter can be rebuilt and linked.  
At the final step during the election, if the authority made the faked or duplicated receipt 
to different voters, the clash attack could be applied successfully. 
We will adopt ring signature’s basic property and clash attack solution to achieve 
a better explanation to readers on our scheme RE-NOTE.  Figure 3.10 shows the 
information flow between voters and voting authorities in the election. We still have three 
election authorities: EC, BDC, and VCC.  Eligible voters will be divided into several 
groups to reduce the possible ring signature size and improve the calculation efficiency.  
After certifying the voter’s eligibility, EC issues this voter a key of EC that is only shared 
among BDC and all other eligible voters to form the ring signature. Every voter will 
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choose a random number to sign a ring signature to keep himself anonymous by showing 
the signature.  Once BDC verifies that the signature is valid, they will acknowledge that 
this voter is eligible to get a new plain ballot. Apart from the ring signature, each voter 
does not need to show any identification to the authority (BDC) and there is no linkage 
between the signature and voter’s identity either. Therefore, this ring signature method 
definitely ensures voters confidentiality and privacy at the ballot distribution step.  
 
 
Figure 3.10 Flow diagram of how voters interact with election authorities. 
 
Watchdog devices are also used for securing and monitoring the online voting 
behaviors at voter side. We still need to implement the special device (watchdog) to 
provide a reliable voter-reorganization through the Internet in RE-NOTE as an enhanced 
model.  
We will discuss the ring signature based ballot distributing function along with 
clash attack prevention as below.  
Step 1: EC will check each voter’s eligibility. Once this voter is verified, EC will 
assign the key KEC and the certificate M to him. This shared key KEC will be only 
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transferred from BDC to those voters who passed the registration verification.  And this 
key can be set to different value among a large number of groups. The voter uses the ring 
signature algorithm to encrypt the certificate with his/her own random pick. Then, the 
voter can request the ballot from BDC by sending the ring signature. 
Step 2: When BDC receives the ring signature from the voter, BDC checks the 
ring signature to verify whether it comes from the authority EC since the signature must 
contain the key KEC and the certificate M from EC. If the ring signature passes the check 
by BDC, it means this voter is eligible to obtain a plain ballot. In the meantime, voter’s 
identity is hidden and protected.  
Step 3: The voter receives the ballot from BDC.  The flag in the watchdog will be 
set to record this action to prevent the possible second ballot requesting or receiving 
action. 
Step 4: The ballot mode and vote casting have been described in E-NOTE. We 
will continue with the solution to prevent clash attack on vote verification step.  
Step 5: The voter casts the vote along with a random number chosen by 
herself/himself to VCC, and a receipt with tracking number will be generated with this 
random number and sent back to the voter. The voter can use this tracking number to 
review and track his/her vote, and this action will be also recorded in the watchdog at the 
voter side.    
Step 6: While VCC collects all the data required for vote counting, VCC uses its 
own key to decrypt votes, and the marker still remains unknown since VCC does not have 
the key to decode. This step ensures that all types of ballots remain anonymous to VCC.  
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Step 7: VCC tabulates and publishes the results for each type of ballots and then 
sends them to EC. The candidate’s name is still unknown to VCC because of the 
encrypted marker.  
Step 8: BDC publishes the private key on the bulletin before EC reveals the value 
of marker on all ballots, and calculates the final tally of the votes according to the 
candidate names. Since those steps are open to the public during the vote counting, 
authority will have no opportunity to manipulate the voting tally in the public domain. 
Step 9: Every voter can check his own vote with the vote tracking number. If the 
authority manipulates the process by giving the same receipt/tracking number to different 
voters, described as the clash attack above, voters will get the votes associated with a 
random number. Since this random number was picked personally by the specific voter, 
it is easy to detect the clash attack from voters if the attack has been applied.  
Our proposed process is a method to protect voter’s privacy better as well as offer 
a better way for voters to verify their own votes. Once the authority BDC receives the 
ballot request from the anonymous voter, they still cannot locate or track the voter’s 
identity even if the ring signature is checked correctly. As described above, we have 
reduced communication steps from either BDC or EC to voters through the Internet, 
versus those steps described in E-NOTE.  The voting authorities, EC, BDC and VCC, are 
independent of each other to ensure absolute fairness during the election. Our revised E-
voting scheme RE-NOTE can mitigate both of these concerns by utilizing a decentralized 
counting process thus can better protect voter confidentiality. 
Next, the same ballot distribution procedure will be calculated by ring signature 
in mathematic form. 
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We will illustrate the mathematical formula of our proposed method. Suppose l 
voters form a voting group and there are w candidates: 
As: Voter s batch code or group number 
Bs: Voter s basic information including date of birth, identity number and gender, 
etc.  
 
Ds: Voter s choice  
Cs: Candidate’s name where s is from 1 to n.  
KEC: EC’s key required for eligible voters to form a ring signature  
REC: EC’s private key in the group 
M: the certificate given to voters by EC; the voter needs to show M with the ring 
signature to BDC to obtain the plain ballot from BDC. 
 
Suppose we have a simple case where there is only one group of voters. In reality, 
all voters will be divided into several groups or batches based on the voters’ registration 
county or state. According to the method discussed above, we denote (𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖) to be a 
pair of the public and private key of each ring group member except EC in the group, and 
(KEC, REC) to be the public and private key of EC. The public key KEC may be different 
in the different groups, and it is only shared between BDC and those voters who have 
negotiated with EC. We denote voter s as one of the group members.   
Step 1: Voter s sends data array (Bs, As) to EC for registration. EC will not 
distribute the certificate M and the key KEC to voter s until voter s passes EC’s voter 
registration check.  
Step 2: After voter s gets the certificate M and key KEC from EC, voter s will have 
all public keys of each group member (𝐶𝐶𝐾𝐾𝐶𝐶,𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃1,𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃2, …𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙),  
Let  
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Ɵ=(𝐶𝐶𝐾𝐾𝐶𝐶,𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃1,𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃2, …𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙)  
be the list of public keys. Voter s calculates the signature by using some 
independent cryptographic hash functions:   𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠 =Hash (Ɵ) 
     Pick the random value 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠 from {0,1} and  calculate every 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 with the equation: 
)( ii xfy =       (1≤i≤l, i≠s,) 
)( KECKEC xfy =  
     𝑓𝑓( )and 𝑓𝑓−1( ) are a pair of function and its reverse function. After voter s 
calculates all 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 required to form a ring signature, voter s will get the specific 𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠 as below:  
 
C𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠( 𝑦𝑦𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾, 𝑦𝑦1,,𝑦𝑦2, … 𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠, … … 𝑦𝑦𝑙𝑙 ,𝑀𝑀,  𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠) = 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠          
Then computes: 
)(1 ss yfx
−=                                       
     C𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠() is considered as the signature verification function.  
Finally, the ring signature is generated as:  
 
(Ɵ , 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠 , 𝑀𝑀,  𝑥𝑥𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾,𝑥𝑥1, 𝑥𝑥2, … 𝑥𝑥𝑠𝑠. 𝑥𝑥𝑙𝑙) 
Step 3: After BDC receives this ring signature  
(Ɵ , 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠 , 𝑀𝑀,  𝑥𝑥𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾,𝑥𝑥1, 𝑥𝑥2, …𝑥𝑥𝑠𝑠 . 𝑥𝑥𝑙𝑙) from the voter, BDC will verify the value by 
using: 
C𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠( 𝑦𝑦𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾, 𝑦𝑦1,,𝑦𝑦2, … 𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠, … … 𝑦𝑦𝑙𝑙 ,𝑀𝑀,  𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠) = 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠            
Obviously, this ring signature contains EC’s key information and the certificate 
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M. If this signature passes the check, it does mean that the voter is eligible since EC only 
distributes its own information above to the eligible voters.   
Step 4:  Voter s is eligible to receive the plain ballot from BDC.  The ballot format 
can be described as:  Denote c[i] to be the name of the ith candidate and array c = (c[1], 
c[2], …, c[w]) to be the packet containing the list of names of the candidates in the 
election. 
BDC generates two sets of data for each eligible voter which is the ballot marker 
along with the list of candidates. BDC encrypts the marker  with the key that is known 
to BDC only. 
We have 
)1')(1( −−= kkα , 
where 'kkz = , k and 'k are large numbers. 
We select 1<h<α such that gcd(ℎ,𝛼𝛼) = 1 . 'h and h are chosen so that they satisfy 
the following: 
1)mod'( =αhh   
and h’ is the multiplicative inverse of  αmodh  respectively.  
The marker t  are encrypted as follows: 
αmodhtT =                                             
BDC holds both h’ and h, i.e., VCC does not have the key for decrypting the 
marker T in the packet.  
Step 5: When the voter casts the vote, they will send the voting data 
),],[],...,2[],1[( szTwddd  with the marker  to VCC. The binary array d represents the choice 
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of voter s.  sz  is the random number that enables voters to verify his votes.   
Step 6: VCC receives array d from all voters, and the votes are tallied for each 
type of marker T.  Then VCC generates unique confirmation number with each  sz  and 
array d that will be used for voters’ verification step. The confirmation sver will be sent 
back to voter s. 
While VCC can gather all information as below: 
),)][,...,]2[,]1[(( TwdddTALLY iiiT ∑=  
),)][,...,]2[,]1[(( Twddd
iii∑ ∑ ∑=  
)),(( TzDatabase iT ∑=                                                   
Here, 
TTALLY  is the temporary tally result for the ballots with the same marker T. 
∑ )][,...,]2[,]1[( iii wddd  represents the sum of the votes for every candidate, i.e., ∑ ijd ][  
represents the number of votes received by candidate j.  iver  will be stored in a database 
for voting receipts. It allows voters to track and verify the votes they cast. 
Step 7: After VCC finishes counting procedure, each  TTALLY  with the same 
marker T is unveiled to all voters and transmitted to EC. At the same time, BDC will 
unveil the private key to all the voters, EC uses its own key to decrypt the marker as 
αmod'hTt =  then tallies the final results. 
Step 8: Voter s can make an inquiry whether his voter has been counted correctly 
and verify his own vote in the final tally.  He sends his vote tracking confirmation sver  to 
the authority. Since voter s is anonymous as we describe above, the authority will not 
discover the exact checker, but have to provide the votes along with the random number 
sz that was picked up by this specific voter.  
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We need to emphasize that our proposed model RE-NOTE is based on the ring 
signature in ballot distribution process for voters to exchange the required information 
with authorities during the election.  Comparing with the three-pass algorithm, we have 
following important advantages: 
Simplifying the communication step:  In E-NOTE, there are several steps between 
voters and EC or BDC through the Internet to locate the voters; in RE-NOTE, there is 
only one communication step between voters and each authority to identify the eligible 
voters. It will be beneficial for future network resource to adopt the large scale election 
through the Internet media. 
Refining the size of voter groups: Since we use the ring signature to setup one part 
of election procedure, voters are required to be divided into different groups or batches, 
the communication packets will be fixed due to the fixed size of the ring signature.  This 
would make it easier for authorities to manage the voters in a large scale. Since every 
county and every state have different candidates in different race, it is easier to divide 
millions of voters into smaller voting group to make the algorithm applicable.  
Due to the fact that more communication steps are required for the three-pass 
algorithm in E-NOTE, using ring signature may reduce the communication steps between 
voters and the authorities during the ballot distribution procedure. Our new proposed 
scheme RE-NOTE will provide a better encryption scheme to ensure a real protection for 
ballot distributing that would prevent the authorities such as BDC, EC from conducting 
malicious activities. 
Most voting election has the privacy requirement that there should be no 
association between the cast vote and the voters’ identity. RE-NOTE goes further beyond 
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by disassociating the relationship between the voters and assigned ballots as well. Our 
other implemented methods such as the watchdog device can also be transplanted to RE-
NOTE to build an E-voting model so that reliable and authentic voters can communicate 
with the authorities. If there are any voting disputes claimed by voters, it will be a good 
recorder for authority’s further investigation.  
The novelty of RE-NOTE is to create several groups to setup the mutual restrictive 
relationship between the voters and the voting authorities.  The ring signature will secure 
the anonymity of the voters to the authorities. The outlined scheme also eliminates voter 
anonymity leakage and protects both voters’ and candidates’ confidentiality and privacy.  
The application of the ring signature scheme will increase the security and cryptography 
level on the voters’ confidentiality and anonymity. If the number of the voters is large 
enough, the possibility for hackers to decode the message encrypted by ring signature will 
be greatly reduced. 
We have illustrated the enhanced E-voting system, RE-NOTE, which protects 
the voters’ anonymity. In addition, we have developed the framework and hardware 
method that can better protect voter confidentiality and keep voter anonymous. 
3.5 Multi-part Ballot Based Name and Vote Separated E-voting System (M-NOTE) 
Since our assumption is based on a no-fully trusted authority, it is important to consider 
the possible clash attack issue and find a solution in our proposed system. Consider the 
following scenarios:  
Malicious authorities provide fake or duplicate receipts to different voters and 
then instigate the clash attack successfully.  
A hacker obtains a portion of a ballot and finds out what the voter actually voted.  
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A hacker reconstructs a valid original ballot by collecting all portions that were 
assigned to a specific voter.  
If any of the above ever happens, the relationship between voters and their votes 
can be exposed, and the anonymity aspect of the E-voting system will be compromised. 
A multi-part ballot is defined as a kind of ballot containing several separable parts. 
Each candidate is listed in a permutation from CAN-1 to CAN-β on the ballot. Each 
separable single-part only contains one vote for one candidate out of all the candidates. 
The choice on the single-part could be “yes” or “no”, and every single-part of the multi-
part ballot contains a unique sequence number (as shown in Figure 3.11 as the blackened 
area). Every single-part (see Figure 3.12) contains one choice of a specific candidate no 
matter the vote is “yes or no” on it. All of the single-part ballots will be cast to VCC and 
counted independently. Since we have β candidates in the election, the number of single-
parts is set to β.   
Since a multi-part ballot contains β single-parts, where each single-part has a type 
marker because the total number of ballot type is φ (1≤ φ ≤ β!), a sequence number Se (1≤ 
Se ≤ β), and a checkbox is defined to indicate whether this candidate is voted or not. Our 
multi-part ballot design will add an extra security level to protect candidate’s identity and 
the vote information from being hacked as compared with the scheme containing the 
integrated ballot information of a voter’s vote in the election. Figure 3.12 illustrates a 
sample of this multi-part ballot scheme with β equal to 3. After the voter casts his/her 
ballot, it will be counted in a more secure way by disassociating candidates’ identities 
with the corresponding permutation on an assigned ballot. 
Instead of attacking the robust E-voting system, hackers may try to intercept the 
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voting data through the Internet. We need to reduce the voting data transmitted to a 
minimal so that the proposed E-voting scheme can be maximally protected and secure the 
whole E-voting procedure. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.11 A sample of a plain multi-part ballot for a three candidates’ race. 
 
 The operation procedure of M-NOTE can be described as follows:  
EC verifies every voter’s identity. Once a voter is verified, EC will authorize this 
voter’s voting privilege and a ballot will be distributed to him/her by BDC. The detailed 
ballot distribution procedure is described in, in which we also describe how the voters’ 
anonymity is well protected during the ballot distribution phase by using ring signature. 
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Figure 3.12 Single-part portions which show three candidates race with the 
marked ones on the top. 
  
The voter receives a ballot from BDC and its format is shown in Figure 3.11.   
As described in our previous works, a watchdog device is used to record and 
monitor the entire online voting transactions. Only the voting authorities have access to 
the data stored in the watchdog device. The ballot distribution transactions will be 
recorded in the watchdog device to avoid any multiple or duplicated ballots. 
After making his/her choices on the ballot, the voter separates the ballot into parts 
(as shown in Figure 3.12) and casts them to VCC along with the set of trackers. 
The voter can use these trackers to review and track his/her vote anonymously in 
the final tally.  The whole procedure is also recorded in the watchdog device.  This will 
prevent the receipt-based clash attack during the vote verification and ballot 
reconstruction phases. 
If a voter wants to verify his/her vote, the voting authorities must show him/her 
the corresponding trackers that have been recorded from the multi-part ballot. These 
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trackers must match with the ones the voter has recorded earlier. This procedure ensures 
that each vote will be counted without being compromised in the final tally. Figure 3.13 
shows the procedural flow of M-NOTE. 
 
 
Figure 3.13 The block diagram of a voter interaction  
with election authorities by using a multi-part ballot. 
 
Since the voter’s identity is anonymous during the ballot distribution phase, the 
tracker chosen by the voter cannot be linked back to his/her identity.  Note that each 
tracker chosen by the voter comes from a single database and it is unique for all voters 
during the election.  In the vote verification step, if a voter makes an inquiry in the final 
tally, the authority cannot respond with a manipulated vote since the inquirer’s identity is 
not known to the authorities. In the situation that the malicious authority instigates the 
clash attack to manipulate the vote count by generating exactly the same receipt/tracking 
number to different voters, it will be quite easy for the voters to detect the attack as well, 
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for the same reason that the authority cannot identify each voter and respond with a 
matched tracker. 
We illustrate the mathematical formulation in our scheme M-NOTE by 
assuming there are M voters participating in the election with N candidates: 
Ai: Voter i’s group number; 
Bi: Voter i’s basic identification and other information;  
di[j]: Voter i’s choice (either 0 or 1),  where j is from 1 to N. To improve the 
security level, every type of ballots may have the reversed definition of the choice. For 
example, type 1 may define 0 for voting “yes” and 1 for voting “no” while type 2 may 
do the opposite, 0  for voting “no” and 1 for voting “yes”.  
Step 1: Voter i sends data array (Bi, Ai) to EC for registration. The voter will get 
a ballot from BDC after passing the voter registration check by EC.  
Step 2:  When voter i casts the vote, the voting data (𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖[1], 𝑆𝑆[1],𝑂𝑂𝑥𝑥, 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖[1]), (𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖[2], 𝑆𝑆[2],𝑂𝑂𝑥𝑥, 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖[2]),  ..., (𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖[𝐼𝐼], 𝑆𝑆[𝐼𝐼],𝑂𝑂𝑥𝑥, 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖[𝑁𝑁]) 
will be sent to VCC. The binary array 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 represents the encrypted choices of 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 and 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖[𝑗𝑗]  
(1<j<N) is a set of unique random numbers used as trackers that were initially generated 
by the authorities and could be modified by voters. This set of tracker numbers will enable 
the voter to verify and audit his/her vote. S[j] (1<j<N) is the sequence number of a single-
part ballot. 𝑂𝑂𝑥𝑥 (1<x<N!) is the encrypted marker used to represent the ballot type.  
Step 3: Voter i will save all 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖[𝑗𝑗]  as the receipt of casting the vote.  
Step 4: VCC receives the array  𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖   from all voters, and these votes will be 
grouped according to the marker 𝑂𝑂𝑥𝑥.  Then, VCC uses its private key to decrypt the entire 
encoded data array 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖  to count the votes.  
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While VCC tallies the votes: 
𝑂𝑂𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌𝑇𝑇𝑥𝑥 =   ((�𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖[1],�𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖[2], … ,�𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖[𝐼𝐼] , (𝑧𝑧1[1], . . . , 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖[𝑗𝑗]),𝑂𝑂𝑥𝑥) 
At this time, the trackers will be stored separately along with the votes for each 
candidate in the election database as below:    
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐾𝐾1 = �𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖[𝑗𝑗], (𝐶𝐶1)𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖[𝑗𝑗]� 
……..𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐾𝐾𝑁𝑁 = �𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖[𝑗𝑗], (𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁)𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖[𝑗𝑗]� 
Here, (𝐶𝐶1 𝐶𝐶2….𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁) is the set of candidates. 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐾𝐾1  stores the data related to 
every vote and tracker for candidate 𝐶𝐶1. 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖[𝑗𝑗]  represents the collection of the trackers for 
every candidate, i.e., (𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗)𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖[𝑗𝑗] (1≤ j ≤N) is the final tally for candidate 𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 accordingly with 
all votes. Each unique tracker is the key for voters to retrieve and locate their own votes 
anonymously.    
Step 5: Voter i can make an inquiry to verify whether his/her votes have been 
counted correctly by checking the corresponding  𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖[𝑗𝑗] in the candidate’s database. Since 
voter i is anonymous, the authority will not be able to discover the identity of the actual 
inquirer but has to provide the votes along with the tracker 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖[𝑗𝑗] that was selected earlier 
(in Step 2) by this specific voter.  
3.6 Time-lock and Timed-release Scheme 
To prevent manipulation and alteration from malicious authorities such as EC in the final 
tally, we introduce the time-lock and timed-release protocol that will be used to secure 
the manifest of candidate orders on each specific ballot type during the whole election 
(May, 1993).  The basic idea of the time-lock and timed-release crypto is to encrypt a 
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message and then decode it in a future time point in order to lock this important message 
for a certain period of time.  In the new proposed model, the order of candidates on each 
type of ballot will be securely locked (unable to be decoded and changed) for a certain 
time. Normally we set this certain period to be the whole duration of the corresponding 
election. Once election ends, there is no need to hide the manifest of the ballot type. 
Hence, this time-lock could be used to restrict some other unauthorized access on the 
manifest in terms of time. The term “manifest” refers to a document, which provides 
comprehensive details of the ballot type and candidate sequence associated with each 
ballot type design in the election. Meanwhile, we will enhance and extend the existing 
framework of our research work by introducing a new method that can further restrict any 
malicious authority’s activities    
Suppose we have a political election with two candidates as shown in Table 3.4. 
There are two permutations of candidates, and therefore we have two types of ballots. 
After all ballots are collected and VCC begins to count votes, the voting result is 
published without releasing any candidate’s identity or the permutations in Table 3.5.  As 
compared with the type of ballot shown in Table 3.4, we can obtain the final voting result 
as shown in Table 3.6. Alice wins the election by receiving 35 votes vs Bob’s 5 votes. 
If Bob is the desired winner by the malicious authority EC, EC could alter the 
manifest of permutations to temper the voting results. Table 3.4 could be altered to the 
one shown in Table 3.7 and the manipulated voting results would be as shown in Table 
3.8. Obviously, with the manipulated permutation, Bob eventually wins the election. This 
is a kind of attack we need to defend by applying the time-lock and timed-release scheme. 
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Table 3.4 Example of Two Type of Ballot with Different Candidate Permutations 
Ballot Type A Ballot Type B 
Alice Bob 
Bob Alice 
 
 
Table 3.5 Voting Results without Releasing the Actual Candidate Permutation Info 
Ballot Type A Ballot Type B 
Choice 1: 12 Choice 1:   4 
Choice 2:  1 Choice 2: 23 
 
 
Table 3.6 Authenticated Voting Results According to the Released Candidate 
Permutation  
 
Ballot Type A Ballot Type B 
Alice : 12 Bob : 4 
Bob : 1 Alice : 23 
 
 
 
Table 3.7 Manipulated Permutations at Malicious Authority’s Favor 
Ballot Type A Ballot Type B 
Bob Alice 
Alice Bob 
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Table 3.8 Tampered Voting Results with Manipulated Candidate Permutation 
Ballot Type A Ballot Type B 
Bob : 12 Alice : 4 
Alice : 1 Bob : 23 
 
3.7 Voter Jury 
The time-lock and timed-release protocol employs a trusted agent to operate the time-
lock scheme and to release the time-lock after a certain time, which is called “time puzzle”. 
In our research work, the original “trusted agent” defined in the time-lock and timed-
release protocol will be replaced with a voter jury composed of a group of voters to 
supervise the time-lock. Similar to jury members in the court, every voter can be 
randomly chosen to be the voter jury member or pre-registered prior to the election to 
conduct the legal exercise.  All jury members’ identities can be published to the public. It 
is a basic requirement to incorporate the time-lock and timed-release scheme into our E-
voting system model. 
Since we apply time-lock and timed-release mechanism into our E-voting system 
model, we need a decentralized trusted agent instead of a single trusted agent to generate 
the time-lock and timed-release puzzle. It is more favorable to have more than one trusted 
agent to form a shared key by voter jury members to operate the time puzzle to ensure the 
fairness of this phase. As described in Section 3.6, the time-lock and timed-release 
mechanism is suitable to deter this type of attacks. It takes a certain time T for anyone to 
compute the encrypted message without knowing the key. We normally set the certain 
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time T to be the length of the election duration. So even if the manifest of the list of 
permutations is hacked after computing for a certain time, the election has ended. Then, 
the manifest of candidate permutations on each ballot type is regularized and any 
modification during the election is impossible. 
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CHAPTER 4  
VOTING PROTOCOL WITH ANTI-ATTACK SOLUTIONS 
 
The main features of our voting protocol include:  
(1) voter anonymity throughout the process (after registration),  
(2) vote verification in the final tally, and  
(3) safe guard against malicious authorities from manipulating received votes. 
The voting protocol consists of the following steps:  
(1) The voter’s eligibility is verified at EC and is assigned a digital certificate from 
EC.  
 
(2) The voter requests ballot anonymously from BDC using the certificate.  
(3) BDC verifies the voter eligibility and assigns a multi-part ballot (one of the 
several types).  
 
(4) The voter designates tracking number on the vote and cast the vote to VCC.  
(5) VCC counts ballots based on ballot types and releases the voting summary to 
the public.  
(6) The ballot type manifest is released and the final result is tallied.  
(7) The voter can anonymously inquire their vote with the confirmation number. 
 Figure 4.1 illustrates our E-voting system model, referred to time-lock algorithm 
based E-voting system with Ring signature and Multi-part form (TERM). The voting 
process and the various system functionalities will be explained through a voter (Tom) 
voting in the paper ballot mode so that the process can be easily understood.  
We give an example that a voter, Tom, participates in the election, and the voting 
procedure will be introduced as below.  
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Figure 4.1 The whole voting procedure for a voter to send own ballot to VCC and tracking own vote by using the confirmation to 
inquire. 
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4.1 Registration 
First, voter Tom will verify his voting eligibility with the election authority EC prior to the 
election. This is similar to the traditional voter registration process with the difference that 
Tom will now receive a certificate that is required when he requests his ballot from BDC. 
Note that the identity of the voter is not recorded in the certificate. When our proposed E-
voting system is operated through the Internet, the issued certificate will be a digital 
certificate that can be pre-stored in a hardware flash card. This hardware flash card is called 
the watchdog device as mentioned in Chapter 2 and is used for identity recognition and 
recording online communication transactions between this corresponding specific voter and 
election authorities. The flash card does not contain any pre-identified information besides 
EC’s certificate.  Only EC can access the data stored inside for investigational purposes if 
there is a dispute by the specific voter on any voting transactions after the election. The 
function of the digital certificate stored in the watchdog is to prove voter eligibility and also 
to hide the voter’s identity so that EC cannot link a voter to his/her ballot.     
4.2 Time Lock Up the Manifest 
Since a certain amount of ballot types are created in the election, we will incorporate the 
time-lock and timed-release mechanism introduced in the previous section into our 
proposed E-voting system model to prevent malicious authorities from manipulating the 
ballot type manifest during the election. All voter jury members will gather together to 
form a shared key to lock up the ballot type manifest for at least the duration of the 
election. This will prevent a malicious authority such as VCC from manipulating the 
ballot type manifest so as to elevate its own candidate to the leading position.     
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Here we define this message as the manifest of the whole candidate permutations, 
and the certain secure time T is set to be longer than the duration of the election. Since the 
candidate permutation is regularized with each ballot type, any modification during the 
election is impossible.     
We will give a detailed mathematical formulation of the time-lock and timed-
release measurement in next chapter. 
4.3 Voter Identity Encryption 
If BDC is a malicious authority, another serious attack from BDC may occur if Tom shows 
his identification instead of the certificate obtained from EC while he requests the plain 
ballot from it. BDC may use this opportunity to link the assigned ballot info with Tom’s 
identification. This kind of attack will violate the voter privacy rules in a political election. 
To prevent that, we have to use certain measurement to make eligible voters such as Tom 
anonymous to BDC while requesting the plain ballots.  Therefore, we apply ring signature 
to ensure voters’ identity confidentiality. In another word, BDC will not be able to obtain 
any identity information from an anonymous ballot requester other than his/her voting 
eligibility. When we switch to the online E-voting environment, Tom will still use the 
watchdog plugged at his own computer to identify himself as an eligible voter without 
releasing any other personal information. The watchdog is also used to record and monitor 
the entire online E-voting transactions. Only voting authorities have access to the data 
stored in the watchdog if Tom disputes any voting transaction post the election. 
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4.4 Ballot Distribution 
By using the certificate to verify eligibility from BDC, Tom will receive a plain ballot from 
BDC and he will be marked with an electoral ink (such as a semi-permanent ink or dye that 
is applied to the forefinger) to indicate that he has already been assigned a ballot. This 
measurement successfully protects the voters’ anonymity, prevents voters from voting 
more than once, and isolates the assigned ballot and its traceability in the election. When 
we apply the proposed E-voting system model through the Internet, the entire ballot 
distribution transaction will be recorded in the watchdog device so that Tom cannot request 
more than one ballot. The transaction data on the watchdog device can be reviewed to 
resolve any dispute after the election. 
4.5 Voting 
When Tom votes on the ballot, besides the possible attack from malicious authorities 
regarding the manifest, we still need to consider possible clash attacks from malicious 
authority VCC. In a traditional election, the public bulletin board is the only way for voters 
to review and verify the voting result; in our proposed scheme, the public board is 
additionally endowed with voting confirmation inquiry and verification responsibility 
(shown in Figure 4.2).  Voters will mark their own votes on every single part with a system-
wide unique confirmation. These confirmations will be published on the public bulletin 
board for the public’s inquiry and supervisory purpose. In our proposed E-voting system 
model, Tom first checks on the bulletin board to see whether there is a conflict between 
confirmations he chose and those already posted by other voters.  If so, Tom has to pick up 
another new confirmation to replace the conflicted one until all his picks (confirmations on 
every single part) are unique. Then, those confirmations will be written on every single part 
68 
 
 
 
one by one and post on the bulletin at the same time for public inquiry, meanwhile, these 
confirmations are serving as inquiries and trackers post the election.  
With those confirmations on every single part of the original multi-part ballot, the 
malicious authority VCC may not be able to manipulate the vote as easily as the way they 
did as described in the Clash attack scenario.  Because Tom is anonymous after the ballot 
distribution phase, it is not traceable for authorities to link the assigned ballot and the 
corresponding voter. Back to our example, Tom is anonymous to VCC after he got the 
certificate. In the vote audit phase, when Tom sends his confirmations to the authority to 
inquire his vote in the final tally, VCC will not be able to locate Tom’s identity but has to 
respond with Tom’s actual original votes. If VCC generated more than two exact same 
confirmations to different voters to initialize a clash attack,   at this time when Tom inquires 
the voting result by his confirmations, the response does not match his original vote and 
the attack will be detected right away since this is not a one to one mapping’s reverse 
procedure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 The published confirmations on the public bulletin. 
 
𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷 2 𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 
𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶1         𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶3 
𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙𝐷𝐷 4 𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 
𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶2         𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶5       𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶6         𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶9 
𝐶𝐶ℎ𝐷𝐷𝑟𝑟  3 𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 
𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶4         𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶7       𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶8 
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4.6 Ballot Collecting 
After Tom marked his choice on the multi-part ballot, he will tear it into individual single 
parts (as shown in Figure 4.3) and casts them to VCC. VCC will collect all ballots from all 
voters, and then group ballots by categorizing the same marker on each single part and then 
tallying the vote according to the type and the sequence number. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3 A sample of single-part portion which shows  
Three-candidate race with the marked ones on the top. 
 
 
4.7 Releasing the Manifest 
When the tally result including voters’ confirmations is published on the public bulletin, 
the manifest of the ballot types is the only unknown factor in the election. The voter jury 
members will get together again and reform the manifest, and then EC will announce the 
final vote tally for each candidate according to the necessary ballot information release. 
The public bulletin contains all confirmations from all voters. In our example, Tom 
can verify his own vote by checking his confirmations with those posted on the public 
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bulletin. Tom can also verify the voting result of the election in several different ways from 
the public bulletin (details on inquiry related to the security concern will be discussed in 
Chapter 4). In addition, a voter’s whole voting process is recorded in this specific voter’s 
watchdog device, and this can also prevent the duplicated voting in the election. If Tom 
wants to dispute the voting results, he must present his watchdog device containing all 
complete voting data transactions to the authority for further investigation.  
Besides security features, our protocol also provides a great of diversity and 
flexibility for voters and candidates to achieve a fair election environment with self-audit 
and self-revise the confirmation. TERM has addressed these concerns by using several 
measurements mentioned above. 
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CHAPTER 5  
MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS 
 
In this chapter, we will provide the mathematical analysis of our proposed system. 
5.1 Pre-election  
The time-lock and timed-release cryptography used to lock the candidate manifest can be 
generalized as below: 
Since we have a voter jury to supervise the authority, and this jury is composed of 
several volunteer voters. Suppose we have j jury members in the jury.  The manifest M 
represents the message to be encrypted by the timed-release cryptography.  According to 
the Secret Sharing method by Shamir, it is divided by j jury members into j shares: 
(𝑀𝑀1,𝑀𝑀2, …𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗) Array M has the properties of Shamir’s Secret Sharing theory as below: 
1. Knowledge of j or more shares can easily reconstruct M.  
2. Knowledge of less than j shares cannot reconstruct M.  
Now we have j jury members to create the time puzzles to encrypt every own share. 
By definition, all j members must show up at the time T to decrypt M then the manifest 
could be reconstructed. The reason to have multiple members in this scheme instead of 
single trusted agent discussed in the Time-lock and Timed-release cryptography is that we 
assume any single voter or authorities are not fully trustable. This assumption is practical 
in reality as we have seen several cases of political elections disputes. Thus, we introduce 
this court-like jury composed of several either voluntary or selective voters to supervise 
this time-lock and Timed-released process.   These j members will create the time puzzle 
as below:  
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1. Each jury member chooses a composite modulus  𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 = 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖    𝐴𝐴 ∈ (1,2 … 𝑗𝑗)  
2. Calculates the Euler’s totient function:  
Ф(𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖) = (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 − 1)(𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 − 1)   𝐴𝐴 ∈ (1,2 … 𝑗𝑗)  
3. Chooses 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,(1 < 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 < Ф(𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖)), gcd(𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,Ф(𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖)) = 1  randomly, where the 
function gcd(.,.) finds the greatest common divisor, such that the inverse exponent 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖  that 
satisfies:  
𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 = 1 𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑Ф(𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖)     𝐴𝐴 ∈ (1,2 … 𝑗𝑗)  
4. According to the time-lock puzzle definition, the puzzle factor t can be 
calculated by t=TS.  We need to emphasize that the puzzle t can be applied to all jury 
members because all shares of the manifest M need to be released at the same time to 
reconstruct M. And we set T at least to be longer than the election duration. 
5. Computes   
𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 = 2𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑 Ф(𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖)  
and 
𝑑𝑑′𝑖𝑖 = 2𝑡𝑡 + Ф(𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖) − 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 + 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖  
6. Choose a random number 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 (1 < 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 < 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖)   , encrypt 𝑑𝑑′𝑖𝑖 as: 
𝐷𝐷′𝑖𝑖 = 𝑑𝑑′𝑖𝑖 + 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖2𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑 𝐶𝐶  
7. Then every jury member will publish (𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 , 𝐷𝐷′𝑖𝑖) instead of (𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 ,𝑑𝑑′𝑖𝑖) to the 
public. (𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 , 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖) is the private key of each jury member. 
8. Here, we illustrate that each share of the manifest will be encrypted by every 
jury member through their own private key 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 as below: 
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𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 = 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖  𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  
Then we have the time puzzle (𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 , 𝐷𝐷,𝐷𝐷′𝑖𝑖,𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖). All shares of the manifest have 
been encrypted by jury members safely. Neither the public nor authorities could see, 
reconstruct or manipulate them, since the public and authorities do not have information 
about (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖, 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖) and it is very hard to factor them. Nobody can calculate the function Ф(𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖) 
to get the key of each jury member directly without (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖, 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖). There is no faster way to 
compute (𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖2
𝑡𝑡
𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖) by sequentially starting with 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 and computing t squaring. 
For practical purposes, we may ask jury members to form a shared key to encrypt 
the manifest or we could divide the manifest into J shares to be encrypted by jury members 
to reduce the complexity and time costing. 
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 Table 5.1 Notations 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 The random number chosen by 
voter jury member i 
𝑀𝑀 The manifest of the candidate 
permutations 
𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 The original public key of  voter 
jury member i 
𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 The modulus that voter jury member i 
gets 
𝑑𝑑′𝑖𝑖 The result of 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 by adding 
functions 
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 Large prime that voter jury member i 
chooses 
𝐷𝐷′𝑖𝑖 The encrypted public key of 
voter jury member i 
𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 Large prime that voter jury member i 
chooses 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 The private key of voter jury 
member i 
𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 The reminder of each i’s computation 
𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖′ Voter 𝐴𝐴′ personal identification 
and other information 
𝑆𝑆 The processing speed of the server 
𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖′ Voter 𝐴𝐴′ voting group number 𝐷𝐷 The time puzzle factor to create the 
puzzle 
𝐴𝐴 The index of voter jury member,  𝐴𝐴 ∈ (1,2 … 𝑗𝑗) 𝑂𝑂 The time-lock and release puzzle 
𝐴𝐴′ The index of voter               𝐴𝐴′ ∈(1,2 … 𝑥𝑥) 𝑥𝑥 The number of voters 
𝑗𝑗 The number of voter jury 
members 
𝑦𝑦 The number of candidates 
𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑤𝑤 The marker on every ballot 
representing the type 
𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒[] The sequence number on a single port 
𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 The encrypted share of manifest 
M 
𝑂𝑂𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑤𝑤 The tally result for TPw 
𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖′[𝑗𝑗′] The confirmation for voter 𝐴𝐴′ on 
candidate 𝑗𝑗′ 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐾𝐾𝑗𝑗′ The tally contains votes for𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗′ 
𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖′ [𝑗𝑗′] Voter i’ choice (either 0 or 1) 𝑗𝑗′ The index of candidates,  𝑗𝑗′ ∈(1,2 … 𝑦𝑦) 
𝑤𝑤 The number of types of 
ballots, 𝑤𝑤 ∈ (1,2 …𝑦𝑦!) 𝐶𝐶𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖′ The certification of voter  𝐴𝐴′ 
𝐶𝐶𝐾𝐾𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖′ The group key of EC used for 
ring signature to voter  𝐴𝐴′ 𝑙𝑙 The number of voters in a ring signature 
𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙 The public key of each ring 
signature members 
𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖’ Hash value of  voter  𝐴𝐴′’s calculation 
ᵹ𝑖𝑖’ The random value chosen by  
voter  𝐴𝐴′,  ᵹ𝑖𝑖’ ∈ [0,1] 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖’ The random value chosen by voter  𝐴𝐴′ 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖’ The value calculated by f( ) for  
voter  𝐴𝐴′   
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5.2 Voter Registration and Ballot Distribution 
We will continue our mathematical formulation of the voting process after the time-lock 
and timed-release cryptography has been successfully applied. Suppose there are x voters 
participating in the election with y candidates: 
𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖′: Voter 𝐴𝐴′ group number; 𝐴𝐴′ ∈ (1,2 … 𝑥𝑥) 
𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖′: Voter 𝐴𝐴′ personal identification and basic information required for the election 
registration;  
𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖′ [𝑗𝑗′]: Voter i’ choice (either 0 or 1), where 𝑗𝑗′ is from 1 to y. To improve the 
security level, every type of ballot may have the reversed definition of its corresponding 
choice. For example, in the election, we have several types of ballots,  some types of ballots 
may define “0” for voting “yes” and “1” for voting “no” while the others may reverse the 
definition,  “0”  for voting “no” and “1” for voting “yes”.  
The voting process can be generalized as below:  
Step 1: Voter i’ sends data array (𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖′, 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖′) to EC for registration. EC will authorize 
his/her voting privilege and a certification 𝐶𝐶𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖′ will be assigned to him/her by EC.  Voters’ 
anonymity is well protected with this ring signature cryptography during the ballot 
distribution phase. The reason why we use ring signature scheme instead of group signature 
is due to the advantage of ring signature’s property. The group manager of a group signature 
may conspire and become corrupted to compromise voter anonymity. In a ring signature, 
rings are geometric regions with uniform periphery without center controlling behaviors, 
ring signature can be powerful once members of ring want to be independent.  
Step 2: EC will not distribute the certificate 𝐶𝐶𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖′ or the key 𝐶𝐶𝐾𝐾𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖′ used for the ring 
signature scheme to voter i’ only after voter i’ passes EC’s voter registration check. After 
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voter i’ receives 𝐶𝐶𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖′ and 𝐶𝐶𝐾𝐾𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖′ from EC, voter i’ will have all public keys of each group 
member (𝐶𝐶𝐾𝐾𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖′,𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃1,𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃2, … ,𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙),  
Let  
Ɵ = (𝐶𝐶𝐾𝐾𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖′,𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃1,𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃2, … ,𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙)  
be the list of public keys. Voter i’ calculates the signature by using an independent 
cryptographic hash function:   𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖’ = Hash (Ɵ)  
Voter i’ chooses a set of random values 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖’  as a generator for all other ring 
members. A random value ᵹ𝑖𝑖’ is also selected from [0, 1], then  𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖’ is calculated according 
to the following equation: 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖’ = 𝑓𝑓(𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖’)   (1≤ i’ ≤l, i’≠ i’,)    𝐷𝐷𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖′ = 𝑓𝑓(𝑢𝑢𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖′)  
𝑓𝑓(. ) and 𝑓𝑓−1(. ) are a pair of function/inverse function. After voter i’ uses Eq. 
above to calculate all 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖′ (1≤ i’≤l, i’≠ i’,) required to form a ring signature, voter s will solve 
for 𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠 to form:  
𝜓𝜓� 𝑦𝑦𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖′, 𝐷𝐷1,,𝐷𝐷2, … , 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖’, … , 𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙,𝐶𝐶𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖′,  𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖’� = ᵹ𝑖𝑖’  
Furthermore, 
𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖’ = 𝑓𝑓−1(𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖’)  
     𝜓𝜓 (.) is used to verify the signature according to the definition of the ring 
signature.  
Finally, the ring signature is generated as:  
(Ɵ , ᵹ𝑖𝑖’ , 𝐶𝐶𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖′,  𝑢𝑢𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖′,𝑢𝑢1,𝑢𝑢2, … ,𝑢𝑢𝑙𝑙)  
Step 3: After BDC receives this ring signature  
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(Ɵ , ᵹ𝑖𝑖’ ,  𝐶𝐶𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖′,  𝑢𝑢𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖′,𝑢𝑢1,𝑢𝑢2, … ,𝑢𝑢𝑙𝑙 ) from voter, BDC will verify the value by 
checking: 
𝜓𝜓�  𝐷𝐷𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖′, 𝐷𝐷1,,𝐷𝐷2, … , 𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙 ,𝐶𝐶𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖′,  𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖’� = ᵹ𝑖𝑖’  
Obviously, this ring signature contains EC’s key information and the certificate 
𝐶𝐶𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖′. If this signature passes the check, it means that this voter is eligible since EC only 
distributes its own certificate to the eligible voters.   
 
5.3 Ballot Casting and Vote Counting 
Step 4:  After voter i’ casts the vote, the voting data (𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖′[1], 𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒[1],𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑤𝑤, 𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖′[1]),  (𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖′[2], 𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒[2],𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑤𝑤, 𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖′[2]),  ..., (𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖′[𝑦𝑦], 𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒[𝑦𝑦],𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑤𝑤, 𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖′[𝑦𝑦])                             
will be sent to VCC. The binary array 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖′ represents the encrypted choices of 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖′[𝑗𝑗′] with 
authorities’ public key, and 𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖′[𝑗𝑗′]  (1≤ 𝑗𝑗′≤ y) is a set of unique random numbers defined 
as confirmations that voters may use for tracking purpose. This set of confirmation numbers 
also can help prevent the clash attack from malicious authorities as discussed above. 𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒[𝑗𝑗′] 
(1≤ 𝑗𝑗′≤ y) is the sequence number on every single-part portion of the multi-part ballot. 𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑤𝑤 
(1<w<y!) is the encrypted marker representing the ballot type.  
Step 5: Voter i’ saves all 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖′[𝑗𝑗′]  as the receipt for cast vote. Array 𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖′ is used for 
vote tracking and inquiry purposes post the election. It also can be observed and checked 
by anyone beyond voters.  
Step 6: After receiving all the ballots, VCC groups all portions according to 𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑤𝑤. 
Then, VCC uses its private key to decrypt the entire encoded data array 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖′ to count the 
votes in plain data form without any candidate info. 
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While VCC tallies the votes: 
𝑂𝑂𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑤𝑤=   ((��𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖′[1], 𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖′[1]�,��𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖′[2], 𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖′[2]� , … ,�(𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖′[𝑦𝑦], 𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖′[𝑦𝑦])) ,𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑤𝑤) 
 
The corresponding confirmations will be stored separately along with the votes for 
each candidate in the election database as below:    
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐾𝐾𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁1 = ��𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖′[𝑗𝑗′]� , ��(𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼1)𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖′[𝑗𝑗′]� 
………………….. 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐾𝐾𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑦𝑦 = ��𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖′[𝑗𝑗′]� , ��(𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑦𝑦)𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖′[𝑗𝑗′]� 
 
Here, (𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼1  𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼2….𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑦𝑦 ) represents the set of candidates. 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐾𝐾𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗′   
stores those data related to every vote cast for candidate 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗′(1≤ 𝑗𝑗′≤ y) along with its 
respective confirmation. ∑𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖′[𝑗𝑗′]  represents the gathering of confirmations for every 
candidate, i.e.,  ∑(𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗′)𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖′[𝑗𝑗′](1≤ 𝑗𝑗′≤ y)is the final tally of all votes for candidate 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗′ .  
We need to emphasize that 𝐴𝐴′ (1≤ 𝐴𝐴′≤ x) presented in the final tally for ∑(𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗′)𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖′[𝑗𝑗′] 
may vary as voters’ choices may vary. 𝑂𝑂𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑤𝑤  will then be published on the public 
bulletin, but   the mapping for each type of ballot or the actual candidate permutation on 
the manifest is still unrevealed. 
Step 7: Since the time-lock and timed-release scheme has securely protected the 
manifest, each jury voter uses his/her own key to decrypt his share of the manifest. After 
all shares get decrypted and put together, they can be used to reconstruct the manifest and 
will be published to the public and the bulletin.  Meanwhile, if any voter wants to verify 
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the manifest before it is released, it still takes T period to calculate the public key of each 
jury voter which is  𝑑𝑑′𝑖𝑖   where 𝐴𝐴 ∈ (1,2 … 𝑗𝑗) .  
5.4 Vote Tracking 
If Voter i' wants to verify whether his/her vote have been counted correctly, he/she can 
check the corresponding  𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖′[𝑗𝑗′] in 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐾𝐾𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗′  . Since voter i' is anonymous during 
the ballot distribution phase, the authority will not be able to identify the actual inquirer but 
have to provide the confirmation 𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖′[𝑗𝑗′]  received and its associated vote. Note, the 
response from the authority must match what voter i' has created and recorded earlier, or it 
will be detected by this anonymous inquirer (voter i' ). This procedure ensures that each 
vote will be counted without being altered in the final tally. 
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CHAPTER 6    
ADDITIONAL SECURITY FEATURES  
 
Security is always one of the crucial factors when we evaluate any E-voting system. In this 
chapter, we will evaluate TERM in both security and performance aspects.  
6.1 Security Analysis and Case Study 
To counteract possible attacks from authorities or hackers through the Internet, we will 
introduce additional security features to our E-voting system. 
 
6.1.1    The T time length in Time-lock and Timed-release scheme 
We have described the Time-lock and Timed-release schemes in Section 3.6.  The secure 
time period T is determined by the duration of the election, and then the length of the key 
is determined by T and the processing speed of the processor at the server side.  We ask 
the voter jury to setup the period T together to secure the manifest, so that each voter jury 
member has the same T value to process and releases the Time-lock at the same time. 
Figure 6.1 is shown the time frame for the voter jury members to encrypt their own keys 
to time-lock a message. In reality, the processing speed at each voter jury member may 
vary. The situation will become more complicated if these jury members’ time-lock cannot 
be released at the same time.   
The key size of K equals to by ⌈𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙2(2𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂)⌉ according to the definition. Suppose 
the secure period we want is 3 days which means T=259200 second, and we assume the 
processing speed is 3.4Gbps, then we get K= ⌈𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙2(2𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂)⌉ = ⌈53.95⌉=54, which means 
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the lower bound of the size of K is 54 (Kim, 2010).  For any key with a length of 128 bits, 
it will be long enough to be used as the time-lock and timed-release key. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1 The time lock is locked by all voter jury members  
with same time puzzle. 
 
The formulation defined in (Kim, 2010) gives us: 
K=lg(2ST)  
We can conclude from the above calculation that the longer the key size, the more 
complexity it will bring into the scheme. Therefore, we need to optimize the calculation 
and reduce the complexity of the time-lock and timed-release scheme. We have several 
options as below.  
The first option is to set up several jury members, but each one has a different T 
secure period as shown in Figure 6.2. Since we have j voter jury members. As long as the 
first jury member  𝑗𝑗1 begins to setup the period required for time-lock and timed-release 
scheme, other (j-1) jury members can set up their own time puzzles in turns rather than at 
the same time.  The length of the time puzzle calculated by  𝑗𝑗1 is 𝑂𝑂1. Then when the second 
 
𝑂𝑂𝑗𝑗 
𝑂𝑂𝑗𝑗−1 
𝑂𝑂2 
𝑂𝑂1 
Time to release Time to lock 
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jury member sets the key, the time puzzle of  𝑂𝑂2  can be reduced to (𝑂𝑂 − 𝑂𝑂1).  It’s obvious 
that the computational complexity for the second jury member 𝑗𝑗2 is reduced. Similarly, we 
have each jury member 𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖’s time puzzle is equal to  (𝑂𝑂 − ∑ 𝑂𝑂𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖−1𝑘𝑘=1 ) (1≤ 𝐴𝐴≤ j). Each jury 
member’s time puzzle is decreased so that a faster computation can be achieved while the 
security level of the system remains same.  
Another option is to have each jury member in charge of a certain length of the 
secured period time 𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖. (1≤ 𝐴𝐴≤ j) and  ∑ 𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗
𝑖𝑖=1 >T, and each jury member 𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖(1 <  𝐴𝐴 <  𝑗𝑗) ’s 
secured period must overlap at least two neighbor members except that the first and last 
jury member’  𝑂𝑂1 and 𝑂𝑂𝑗𝑗 , respectively. These two jury members only have one overlap 
with his/her neighbor jury member. Figure 6.3 shows the time-lock and timed-release 
scheme with less complexity on the key size.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2 The time lock is locked by all voter jury members  
with decreased time puzzle. 
 
 
 
 
𝑂𝑂𝑗𝑗 
𝑂𝑂𝑗𝑗−1 
𝑂𝑂2 
𝑂𝑂1 
Time to release Time to lock 
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Figure 6.3 The time lock is locked by all voter jury members  
with overlapped time puzzle. 
 
 
6.1.2     Inquiry from Voter and Through the Public Bulletin 
This dissertation has discussed a clash attack prevention scheme, which could restrict 
manipulating activities from the malicious authority (EC, BDC or VCC).  In this scenario, 
the confirmations are used by voters to track and verify the voting results in the final tally. 
Each confirmation actually can be composed of a set of numbers or characters. These 
confirmations can be originally generated from an authority’s database, and they must have 
a one to one association with the corresponding assigned ballot. In our proposed E-voting 
system model, the voter must inquire whether those confirmations he/she will use conflict 
with other voters’ in the system before casting his/her vote. At this moment, the election 
authority does not know what the voter will exactly vote.  Then, it is very risky and 
unpredictable for the malicious authority to respond with a false inquiry result and 
 
𝑂𝑂1 
Time to release Time to lock 
𝑂𝑂2 
𝑂𝑂𝑗𝑗−1 
𝑂𝑂𝑗𝑗 
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duplicate the same confirmation to different voters at this step. Since the malicious 
authority cannot predict what and who these voters will exactly vote for after having been 
assigned confirmations. As voters are anonymous at the ballot distribution phase, their 
identities will remain anonymous when they obtain these confirmations from the authority 
along with the plain ballots. The voters may either modify or keep those assigned 
confirmations as long as they remain unique in the election’s database. It is the voters’ 
responsibility to inquire the database again to make sure that the intended new 
confirmations are still unique after their modifications on confirmations. All these 
confirmations can be served as receipts for voters to track their votes after the ballot casting 
phase.  
If any voter wants to inquire his/her own vote from the authority in the final tally, 
he/she only needs to provide and  send the corresponding confirmation’s information 
(𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶1, 𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶2, … 𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝑦𝑦) to the authority, and the authority has to respond with the inquirer’s 
original vote to the inquirer accordingly.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.4 The published confirmations on the public bulletin. 
 
 
𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷 2 𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 
𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶1         𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶3 
𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙𝐷𝐷 4 𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 
𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶2         𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶5       𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶6         𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶9 
𝐶𝐶ℎ𝐷𝐷𝑟𝑟  3 𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 
𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶4         𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶7       𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶8 
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The public bulletin is used to record and publish all votes along with each 
corresponding confirmation as shown in Fig 6.4. Voters may check from this bulletin to 
see if there are any duplicated confirmations or whether the total number of votes and 
confirmations match the number of actually participated voters.  This method has 
empowered the voters to monitor and supervise the election. 
6.2 Performance Analysis 
In this section, we will evaluate the performance of our work to demonstrate how it can 
help provision the security features, reliability, and trust-worthiness of E-voting system. 
The proposed work can protect against the clash attack which falls into the category of a 
receipt-based attack by utilizing a multi-part ballot method along with voter-selected 
unique confirmations. We assume that if malicious authorities or hackers are able to 
intercept the packets transmitted through the Internet successfully, then our methodology 
will be the last protection measurement to stop hackers from obtaining the content of 
single-part portions to reconstruct the complete multi-part ballot. Thus, its proper design is 
very important to ensure the fairness and privacy for the whole political election. To 
demonstrate the performance of our methodology, let us calculate the probability that 
malicious authorities and hackers can successfully reconstruct the ballots and manipulate 
the votes during the election. Here any instance of a voter’s vote that can be correctly 
revealed by a hacker from any single part of the multi-part ballot is considered as a 
successful attack.  
The following three analysis methods are considered: 
The probability of successfully reconstructing a single-part portion of a specific 
voter’s vote among the entire voting pool:  
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We denote y as the number of candidates; x as the number of voters. If a hacker or 
a malicious authority wants to initiate an attack on the vote of a specific voter, it requires 
getting 3 factors: the probability of successfully identifying this specific voter is1
𝑥𝑥
.  Then 
since we have y! types of a multi-part ballot and this voter must have used one of them, the 
probability of successfully identifying the correct multi-part ballot type is 1
𝑦𝑦! . The 
possibility of a successful hack on this voter’s choice on a single-part portion of the ballot, 
either 0 or 1, is 1
2
 . Thus the probability of successfully attacking a specific voter’s vote is:  1
𝑦𝑦! ∗ 12 ∗ 1𝑥𝑥 = 12𝑥𝑥 ∗ 𝑦𝑦!  
The probability of successfully reconstructing a single-part portion of a specific 
voter’s vote with respect to a specific candidate: 
Here we still have y candidates and x voters.  Compared with the previous case, we 
need an extra factor to locate this specific candidate, thus an extra 1
𝑦𝑦
 (from y candidates) 
will be applied as shown below:  1
𝑦𝑦! ∗ 1𝑦𝑦 ∗ 12 ∗ 1𝑥𝑥 = 12𝑥𝑥𝑦𝑦 ∗ 𝑦𝑦!  
The probability of successfully reconstructing a valid ballot from all single parts of 
the ballots is: 1(𝑦𝑦!)𝑦𝑦 ∗ 𝑦𝑦!  
 If malicious authorities or hackers successfully intercept the data packet containing 
a single-part portion of a ballot, and want to intercept the second single-part portion from 
the same ballot to reconstruct the original multi-part ballot, the successful probability to 
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achieve this goal is 1
𝑦𝑦! 1(𝑦𝑦−1). We deduce this number as follows: the probability of obtaining 
the second single-part portion in the same type as the first one is 1
𝑦𝑦!, and the sequence 
number of this single-part portion must be different from that of the first single-part portion 
from the same multi-part ballot, thus a probability factor 1
𝑦𝑦−1
 is applied after. With the same 
principle, we can determine that the probability of successfully reconstructing the third 
single-part portion from the same ballot to reconstruct the original multi-part ballot is 
1
𝑦𝑦! 1(𝑦𝑦−2). Here 1𝑦𝑦−2 is applied as the sequence number of the third single-part portion must 
be different from that of the first and second sequence number on the single-part portion. 
So on so forth thus the probability of successfully attacking the (y-1)th single-part portion 
that could be used to reconstruct the original multi-part ballot is 1
𝑦𝑦! 1(𝑦𝑦−(𝑦𝑦−1)) = 1𝑦𝑦!. Therefore, 
the probability of reconstructing an original multi-part ballot from any hacked or existing 
known single-part portion is 1(𝑦𝑦!)𝑦𝑦−1∗(𝑦𝑦−1)!, deduced as below: 1
𝑦𝑦! ∗ 1(𝑦𝑦 − 1) ∗ 1𝑦𝑦! ∗ 1(𝑦𝑦 − 2) ∗ … ∗ 1𝑦𝑦! ∗ 11 = 1(𝑦𝑦!)𝑦𝑦−1 ∗ (𝑦𝑦 − 1)!  
A probability factor 1
𝑦𝑦∗𝑦𝑦! also needs to be applied, as the malicious authority and 
hacker may randomly pick the first single-part portion, which can be among y! types of 
multi-part ballots, and can be among one of N sequence numbers in one multi-part ballot. 
Thus the final probability of successfully reconstructing an original multi-part ballot is 
shown below: 1
𝑦𝑦 ∗ 𝑦𝑦! ∗ 1(𝑦𝑦!)𝑦𝑦−1 ∗ (𝑦𝑦 − 1)! = 1(𝑦𝑦!)𝑦𝑦 ∗ 𝑦𝑦!  
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Note that the calculated result refers to the probability of reconstructing a 
voter’s valid multi-part ballot. This voter could be any participating voter; if the 
hacker wants to reconstruct a valid multi-part of a specific voter, the probability 
would be much lower than the one we presented. On the typical ballot used in 
presidential elections, the number of candidates will be around 10 to 20 including 
the local, state, and congressional races. We choose the number of candidates 
from 2 to 14 for illustration and analysis purpose, and summarize the 
corresponding probability for malicious authorities and hackers to successfully 
reconstruct an original multi-part ballot in Table 6.1. Figure 6.5 and 6.6, 
respectively plot the probability curve accordingly. 
 
 
Figure 6.5 Probability of successfully attacking a specific voter’s vote for 
x=1000, 2000, 3000 while y is from 2 to 14. 
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Figure 6.6 Probability of successfully attacking a specific voter’s vote with the 
respect to a specific candidate  
when x=1000, 2000, 3000 while y is from 2 to 14. 
 
 
Table 6.1 Probability of Reconstructing a Valid Original Multi-part ballot with Different 
Number of Candidates 
# of Candidates Successful Probability 
4 5.02 ∗ 10−7 
6 5.98 ∗ 10−20 
8 2.84 ∗ 10−41 
10 6.96 ∗ 10−72 
12 1.71 ∗ 10−112 
14 1.09 ∗ 10−163 
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CHAPTER 7    
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK    
 
Compared with previous works, TERM has exhibited the following important advantages: 
(1) The probability of successfully reconstructing a ballot by malicious authorities 
or hackers is close to zero. 
 
(2) Setting up a secured time period limits any possible manipulation by malicious 
authorities.  
 
(3) Creating a confirmation can prevent possible clash attack carried out by 
malicious authorities.  
 
Other advantages of TERM are summarized as below: 
Anonymity:  In the ballot distribution phase, the voter’s identity is not associated 
with the ballot received from BDC.  
Verification:  The confirmations chosen by voter can be used to track and verify 
his/her vote in the final tally. These confirmations are unique and exclusive to this specific 
voter who is still anonymous to the authorities.  Any un-matching result will be detected 
immediately during the inquiry process.   
Privacy: Our performance analysis shows that the probability of reconstructing an 
original multi-part ballot by malicious authorities is close to zero as long as the number of 
candidates is above a certain number. For example, if the number of participating 
candidates in the election is 14 (a typical number for presidential elections in the USA 
including senate and house of representative, the probability of successfully reconstructing 
an original multi-part ballot from those single-part portions is 1.09 ∗ 10−163.   
Confidentiality: The manifest will remain undisclosed during the vote counting 
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procedure, to prevent any manipulation in the vote counting phase.  
Security: Using a ballot that separates the candidates’ name and voters’ vote 
enhance the security requirement in the E-voting system. 
Recordable and traceable transactions via the watchdog device:  The watchdog 
device records the entire E-voting transactions. The authorities may use it to investigate 
any dispute such as mismatched voting choices claimed by the voters.   
This dissertation describes a framework for developing an integrated E-voting 
system with diverse security features, several areas of this research can be expanded in the 
future: 
(1)  Voters choosing the ballot type:  Before the election begins, election authorities 
will publish the types of the ballot that will be used in the election. Voters can 
select and choose one of the published ballot types randomly to cast the vote.   
 
(2) Addition performance analysis are needed so that the E-voting protocol can be 
implemented for large-scale elections in the future.  
 
In this dissertation, we have presented an overview of our proposed E-voting 
system model, TERM, which mitigates a number of security concerns such as ballot 
reconstruction, vote manipulation, tampering permutation list of candidates, and clash 
attack from malicious authorities; at the same time, it provisions a secured vote verification 
mechanism and can further mitigate those issues by utilizing a decentralized ballot 
collecting process along with a vote verification feature to better protect both candidates’ 
and voter’s confidentiality.  The 2016 U.S. presidential election has raised awareness of 
many serious issues such as voter fraud, voting machines manipulation (Kaleem, 2016), 
software glitch (Durden, 2016), untrustable authority and hackers. Our proposed TERM  
can readily mitigate some of these issues,  and provide a leap forward in ensuring a fair 
and democratic voting process for future elections.  
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